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FEDERAL POWER AND FEDERALISM:
A THEORY OF COMMERCE-CLAUSE
BASED REGULATION OF
TRADITIONALLY STATE CRIMESt
Harry Litmantt &
Mark D. Greenbergt1

Perhaps no legal topic has generated more scholarly discussion
in the last two years than the meaning of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez.! To many legal thinkers, the
decision-the first since the New Deal to reject an attempted exercise of the commerce power-appeared to undermine long held
assumptions about the commerce power, along with the validity of
a wide range of criminal, social, and environmental statutes that
rest on that power.2 Some commentators, grouping Lopez with the
t This Article is adapted from an address presented at the Symposium, The New
Federalism After United States v. Lopez, Case Western Reserve School of Law (Nov. 1011, 1995).
it Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Office of
Policy Development; Adjunct Professor of Law
(Federal Courts), Georgetown University Law Center.
ttt Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Office of
Policy Development; Member of Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford; Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. Professor William Banks, for example, wrote immediately after the Lopez decision
that "a whole body of federal criminal law, federal environmental law, [and] social policies of an enormous range are in question." Joan Biskupic, Court Signals Sharp Shift on
Congressional Powers, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1995, at A3. Speaking at a roundtable of
professors on National Public Radio, Professor Bruce Ackerman dramatically speculated
that the decision "could well be one of the opening cannonades in the coming constitutional revolution." Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 27, 1995),
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2958158 (pages unavailable). See United States v.
Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 29 (3rd. Cir. 1997) (Supreme Court's "apparent change in course
has resulted in reexamination of the Commerce Clause in a variety of contexts, as liti-
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Court's decisions the same term in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton3 and Missouri v. Jenkins,4 offered the even more dra-

matic assessment that the decision signalled a turning point in the
Court's basic approach to federalism.5
The speculation about Lopez intensified in the wake of the
Court's decision the following term in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.6
Commentators now saw confirmation of the view that Lopez had

been not only a watershed in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but
also the beginning of an upheaval in the Court's approach to federalism. In a front-page story the day after the Court issued its opinion in Seminole Tribe, the New York Times reported that it had
become "evident now that the Lopez decision was a signal that the
current majority is in the process of revisiting some long-settled
assumptions about the structure of the Federal Government and the
constitutional allocation of authority between Washington and the

states." 7

Others, reacting to these sightings of a revolution, have advanced more tempered assessments of Lopez's significance.8 A

gants attempt to persuade the courts that Lopez has breathed new life into statutory challenges that would, in other times, have been rejected summarily."); United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1205 (6th Cir. 1997) ("In the wake of Lopez, courts across the
country have been faced with repeated challenges to a variety of statutes, all of which are
alleged to exceed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause."). A rough gauge
of the extent of the expectations Lopez generated is that more than 400 federal court
opinions have cited it in the two years since it was issued.
3. 115 S. C. 1842 (1995) (holding that the states were not reserved the power under
the Tenth Amendment to impose qualifications for the offices of United States Representatives and Senators in addition to those set forth by the Constitution).
4. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (holding that district court's orders had exceeded scope of
federal power to remedy effects of past discrimination in state school system).
5. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Cautioning Congress to Pull Back, LEGAL TImas, July
31, 1995, at S31. ("Any doubt that federalism lives on as an important issue in constitutional law is put to rest" by Lopez and the Term Limits case); see also R. Cordray,
Courts Rein in Congress's Authority, COLUMBUS DIsPATCH, Aug. 6, 1995, at All ("For
judges and legal scholars who had grown accustomed to thinking in terms of congressional omnipotence, the decision was seen as revolutionary. And it raised a host of new
questions about precisely when Congress can be restrained from imposing supreme federal
law in areas traditionally governed by state law.").
6. 116 S. Ct. 1416 (1996) (holding that Congress lacked authority under the Indian
Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court).
7. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Curb Federal Power to Subject States to Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996 at Al.
8. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution For Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 885, 885 (1996) ("Ini-
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number of scholars, for example, explain the decision as merely a
"sort of 'signalling device'-a reminder to Congress that the Court
is still out there, willing (however reluctantly) to intervene if federal legislators become too complacent about extending their authority."9 Somewhat differently, Robert Nagel suggests that Lopez did
not even apply the test it announced, and predicts that the decision
will be only an isolated gesture because neither the political culture
nor the Justices are devoted to "decentralized decision making.' 0
And Deborah Merritt thinks Lopez "will have very little practical
effect" because Congress can still regulate any conduct that is "a
little more like commerce than the acts depicted by the government
in that case.""

tial reactions [to Lopez] were of the Chicken Little variety and filled with dire predictions
of renewed judicial shackles imposed on a hamstrung federal government. Sober second
thoughts have been, well, sober, and many observers now say that Lopez may not be
such a big deal after all:).
Notwithstanding the basic divide between these two groups of commentators on the
ultimate impact of Lopez, the second wave of commentators has tended to share the view
that Lopez was driven by federalism values. Professors Suzanna Sherry and Robert Nagel
are representative in so portraying the decision, even as they disclaim its lasting impact.
The title of Nagel's essay on Lopez, The Future of Federalism, 46 CAsE W. REs. L.
REv. 643, 660 (1996), sets the tone for his thoughts about devolution of power to the
States, while Sherry explicitly links the decision in Lopez to the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46 CAsE W. Ras. L. REV.
877, 882 (1996) (citing Seminole Tribe); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and
the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. Ras. L. Ray. 801, 842-43 (1996)
[hereinafter Brickey, Crime Control] ("Sounding strong federalism themes, [Lopez] is a
reminder that, contrary to contemporary thought, congressional power under the Commerce
Clause is not unlimited, that states have primary authority to defime and enforce criminal
laws, and that much of what Congress has enacted needlessly alters the balance between
federal and state jurisdiction."); infra Part I1.B.
9. Guns in Schools, 1995: Hearings on S. 890 Before the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the Senate Judiciary Comm., (1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Professor
Larry Kramer), available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 435712, (F.D.C.H.U.), at 26. Professor
Brickey similarly suggests that "Congress could (and perhaps should) view Lopez as a
warning shot across the bow" the real significance of which may be "its symbolic value"
in indicating the judiciary's frustration with "the unchecked growth of federal criminal
law." Brickey, Crime Control, supra note 8, at 839, 840. See also Sherry, supra note 8,
at 877 (explaining Lopez on the theory that in order to have its warnings about the limits
of federal power taken seriously the Court "has to bite someone occasionally-and it does
not much matter whom").
10. Nagel, supra note 8, at 660.
11. Deborah J. Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
685, 692 (1996); see also Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. Ras. L. REv.
695 (1996). According to Frickey, Lopez is best read as at most an invitation to a
"meaningful dialogue between judiciary and legislature concerning... important constitu-
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A recent and little-noticed legislative action has now prepared
the way for the Court to elaborate on its decision in Lopez. On
September 30, 1996, a revised version of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, the statute the Court invalidated in Lopez, was signed
into law. 2 The revised act-which was slipped into an omnibus
spending provision and has therefore escaped notice almost entirely-has the same purpose and effect as its predecessor. Moreover,
it achieves its purpose through statutory terms that are strikingly
similar to the terms of the disapproved statute.
Consideration of the constitutionality of the revised act provides an occasion to address exactly what the decision in Lopez
means. For if the Court were truly in the process of rethinking the
commerce power along the lines posited by many of the commentators, the minor surgery Congress has performed should be insufficient to save the revised act. Indeed, at the time the revision was
first proposed, critics suggested that the Court would consider
Congress's tinkering to have been not only fruitless, but brazen for
ignoring the essential federalism message of the Lopez decision. 3
More broadly, the revised act presents an opportunity to consider the theoretical underpinnings of the commerce power, which
Congress has controversially employed in recent years to establish
concurrent federal jurisdiction over crimes traditionally regulated by
the states. The revised act can be used to frame two questions of
central doctrinal and theoretical importance to Commerce Clause
jurisprudence: (1) Can Congress use the commerce power to reach
any activity involving an item that has crossed state lines, however
remote or tenuous the connection between the interstate passage
and the regulated activity? (2) Does Congress's authority to regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause depend in part on its
purposes? In response to these questions, we develop and defend in
this Article a theory of the commerce power under which Con-

tional values of personal equality and federalism," id. at 729, and the specific result in
Lopez can likely be overridden by means of "explicit legislative findings based on a welldeveloped legislative history." Id. at 728.
12. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208.
13. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive
Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 757, 799 (1996).
Professor Friedman made a similar point in his testimony before the Senate, urging it not
to pass the revised act because "[i]t
does our constitutional system no good to challenge
the Supreme Court unnecessarily in its interpretation of the Constitution." See Hearings
supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman).
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gress, without regard to its purposes, may regulate a harmful activity involving an item that has moved in interstate commerce so
long as the movement is a cause of the harm.
More broadly still, Congress's persistence in bringing the possession of guns in school within the federal criminal law-as represented by the revised act-provokes basic questions of allocation of
power, both between federal and state governments and within the
federal government. To characterize Lopez, as many scholars have,
as a decision about federalism is to suggest that the point of the
decision is that legislation such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act
is an inappropriate encroachment on state authority. Properly understood, however, Lopez does not address the core federalism issue
of what matters are properly committed to state control, at the
level of either constitutional law or wise policy. Rather the decision determines merely that the act does not fall within the scope
of Congress's power, not because it interferes with state functions
but because the regulated activity happens not to have a sufficient
effect on interstate commerce. Many recent federal criminal laws
have been similarly attacked as improper encroachments on state
authority. The charge typically rests on a misunderstanding of the
nature of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction in the criminal
law. In fact, much of the recent federal criminal legislation, including the legislation struck down in Lopez, does not threaten, and
may well promote federalism values. With respect to the ongoing
"federalization debate" 4 the revised act prompts observations
about the appropriate roles of each branch of the federal government, both in identifying and enforcing national priorities and in
attending to federalism values.
Each of these questions-about the meaning of Lopez, the
foundations of the commerce power, and the implications of the
federalization of crime-is illuminated by consideration of the
revised Gun-Free School Zones Act. Part I of the Article describes
the new legislation and explains why, in light of Lopez, the revised
statute is constitutional and will be upheld. Analysis of the legislative fix helps to clarify the contours of Commerce Clause doctrine,
as set out in Lopez. A close reading of the Lopez opinion reveals
that the decision neither articulated a new Commerce Clause theory

14. See Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 967 (1995).
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nor narrowed the boundaries of the commerce power. Rather, the
Court applied standard, if somewhat reconceptualized, doctrine,
striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act because the act as
written did not regulate an activity either in or having a substantial
effect on interstate commerce; the revised act, by contrast, will be
upheld because the fix limits the statute to guns in interstate commerce, thereby making inapplicable the requirement that the activity
regulated substantially affect interstate commerce. We thus endorse
the view that Lopez is not a revolutionary opinion, and that it will
prove far less consequential than some commentators have surmised, although we do so for substantially different reasons from
those that others have advanced. If the Court is in the process of
revisiting basic assumptions about state and federal power (and
cases such as Seminole Tribe-in contrast to Lopez-may so suggest), Lopez did little to advance that process, and its overall impact is likely to be modest, even within Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Part II uses the revised act to explore the theoretical and
doctrinal underpinnings of the commerce power. To spell out our
view, we proceed by considering a series of objections to the revised act from a hypothetical critic who doubts whether the revised
act should or will be upheld. The theme of the objections is that
the differences between the revised act and the act struck down in
Lopez are too inconsequential to demarcate a constitutional line. At
the heart of the objections is the idea that the fix is empty and formalistic. In order to respond to the objections, we explore the
relation between congressional purposes and congressional power.
We argue that regardless of its purposes, Congress may under the
Commerce Clause regulate threats to health and safety that are
caused by interstate commerce. More generally, we argue that
Congress's purposes are irrelevant to the validity of its exercise of
the commerce power. Further, even were Commerce Clause doctrine to be reconceptualized to limit Congress to certain purposes,
preventing interstate commerce from being a vehicle of injury to
health and safety would be an entirely appropriate purpose. We go
on to rebut the objection that the theory of the Commerce Clause
needed to uphold the new act would leave no room for principled
limits on the commerce power, and would, for example, permit
Congress to make it a federal offense to commit any state crime
while wearing an article of clothing that had crossed state lines.
The view that Congress can, under the commerce power, regulate
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harms caused by interstate commerce does not legitimate such allembracing exercises of the power;, rather, since interstate commerce
is not a cause of all harms, only certain problems may be addressed with commerce power.
Finally, Part m considers the idea, prominent in much of the
scholarship on Lopez, that the decision reflects the Supreme
Court's frustration with inappropriate and unwise congressional
enactments in traditionally state areas. We criticize the related
claims that federal statutes such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act
and the Child Support Recovery Act are inappropriate and unwise
uses of federal power, that such statutes are responsible for overwhelming the federal courts and preventing them from fulfiling
important functions, and that the political branches should defer to
the federal judiciary's views about how best to use the federal
courts.

I. THE REVISED GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES Acr
The decision in Lopez prompted Congress and the Executive
Branch to consider whether the policy goals of the invalidated act
could be served by a statute that was within the commerce power
as articulated by the Court. The Attorney General advised the
President that the defect the court had identified could be corrected
by a slight modification in the statutory language.' 5 On June 7,
1995, Senator Kohl (D-Wisconsin) introduced S.890, the slightly
modified version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act that eventually
became law. The Subcommittee on Youth Violence of the Senate
Judiciary Committee held hearings on S.890 in July 1995. The bill

languished in committee thereafter, and did not come up for a vote
until 14 months later, as one of dozens of amendments to an omni-

bus appropriations bill. Late in the day on September 30, 1996, the
eve of the new fiscal year, Congress hurriedly passed and President

Clinton signed into law the6 omnibus bill, including the revised

Gun-Free School Zones Act.'

15. The authors helped draft the modification to the Gun-Free School Zones Act and
to prepare the Department of Justice's analysis in support of the revised act's constitutionality, as well as the subsequent testimony before the Subcommittee on Youth Violence
of the Senate Judiciary Committee by Walter Dellinger, then the Assistant Attorney Gener-

al for the Office of Legal Counsel.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)C(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1996).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:921

The revised act changes the original act only by the addition
of twelve words. The original act stated: "It shall be unlawful for
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone."' 7 The revised act amends this language so that it applies to
such a knowing possession only in the case of a firearm "that has
moved 18in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce."
A careful consideration of the Court's opinion in Lopez reveals the idea behind this seemingly modest change. In Lopez, the
Court identified "three broad categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power."' 9 Congress has the
power (1) to "regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce," including keeping those channels "free from immoral and
injurious uses;" (2) to "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce;"
and (3) to regulate "those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."20 Thus, Congress can regulate or protect activities or things that are in interstate commerce, and prevent injurious
uses of the channels of interstate commerce; however, it can regulate intrastate activities only if they substantially affect interstate
commerce.
With respect to the original statute, the Court was able to
"quickly dispose[" of the first two categories of authority,
concluding that the statute could potentially be sustained only
"under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. ' 21 The Court's analysis is
therefore devoted to the question of whether the intrastate possession of guns in school substantially affects interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Court's decisions.

17. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994 & Supp. 1996). The new sentence reads in full: "It
shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or
that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Id.
19. 115 S. Ct. at 1629. The Court later in the opinion refers to the three categories as
"categories of authority," rather than of activities subject to congressional regulation. Id. at
1630.
20. Id. at 1629.
21. Id. at 1630.

19971

FEDERAL POWER AND FEDERALISM

929

The Court added one important wrinkle to the substantial
effects doctrine by indicating that the effects of individual instances
of the regulated activity may be aggregated only if the activity is
commercial. The Court concluded that because the statute neither
regulated economic enterprise nor was "an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity," it could not be "sustained under
our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce." This conclusion was pivotal in the Court's analysis because it meant that in
gauging the effect of the intrastate activity, the Court would consider the activity in isolation rather than in the aggregate. In other
words, the Court required that the particular possession of a gun in
school (as opposed to the possession of guns in school in the
aggregate) have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Since
an isolated instance of possessing a gun in school would not have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, it followed from the
Court's refusal to aggregate that the statute failed the substantial
effects test and that it could not be upheld under category mII of
Commerce Clause authority.
In sum, the Court treated the original statute as sustainable, if
at all, only under category Ell of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority-the authority to regulate wholly intrastate matters-with
the consequence that the statute's constitutionality depended on the
application of the substantial effects test.
The purpose of the key phrase of the revised act---"that has
commerce -is now apparent. The
moved in ... interstate ...
revision is designed to place the new statute within categories I
and II, rather than category m'I, thus basing the statute on a
different category of Congress's Commerce Clause authority from
the only category that the Court believed could plausibly support

22. Id. at 1631. The gloss on the doctrine thus permitted the Court to distinguish the
landmark decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which the Court portrayed
as a case upholding "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity" 115 S. Ct. at 1630, on the ground that the private, intrastate
activity of growing wheat "involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a
gun in a school zone [does] not." Id.; see also United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct.
1732, 1733 (1995) (per curiam) ("The 'affecting commerce' test was developed in our
jurisprudence to define the extent of Congress's power over purely intrastate commercial
activities that nonetheless have substantial interstate effects.") (citing Wickard) (emphasis
on "commercial" added).
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the original act.2 As explained more fully below, the restriction
of the statute to the possession of guns that have "moved in"
interstate commerce serves to make the statute an exercise of
Congress's power to regulate things in interstate commerce and
also of Congress's power to regulate the channels of interstate
commerce. As a statute based on those categories that authorize the
regulation of interstate, rather than intrastate, matters, the revised
Gun-Free School Zones Act will not have to pass the substantial
effects test in order to be within the commerce power.
Moreover, because of this difference in the source of authority, the question of whether the regulated activity is commercial has
no bearing on the constitutionality of the revised act. The revised
statute is no more a regulation of commercial activity than the
original statute, but the issue should not be relevant because the
statute, as a regulation of interstate matters, would not need to be
sustained as a regulation of intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. Because it seeks to regulate only things in
interstate commerce, the revised act draws on a different source of
Commerce Clause authority from its predecessor. It is, as a consequence, unnecessary for the revised act to pass the substantial
effects test, and therefore also unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the regulated activity is commercial or noncommercial.24 In sum, the revision, while modest in wording, is funda-

23. See 115 S. Ct. at 1630 ("The first two categories of authority may be quickly
disposed of ....
Thus, if [the act] is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.").
24. In addition to adding the phrase "that has moved in" interstate commerce, the
revised act adds the phrase "or that otherwise affects" interstate commerce. This Article
focuses on the principal element of the fix, the requirement that the firearm have moved
in interstate commerce. It is worth pausing, however, to set aside a possible source of
confusion by distinguishing the "otherwise affects" language from the substantial effects
test. The phrase "or that otherwise affects" interstate commerce is designed to serve as a
catch-all provision encompassing any possession of a firearm in a school zone not already
captured by the statute that Congress could constitutionally regulate under the commerce
power. The "otherwise affects" language is well suited to perform this function because a
series of cases have interpreted it or similar words to express congressional intent to
reach to the limit of the commerce power. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431
U.S. 563, 571-72 (1977) (interpreting "in commerce or affecting commerce" in this
manner). There are a variety of kinds of cases in which the catch-all provision could
come into play. For example, even if a firearm had never moved in interstate commerce,
Congress might still be able to prohibit its possession in a school zone if the ammunition
had moved in interstate commerce or if the possessor had crossed state lines en route to
the school zone. In either of these cases, Congress would be regulating a person or thing
in interstate commerce or the use of the channels of interstate commerce. To take a dif-
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mental in effect, moving the act onto different and more secure
legal ground.
II. THE THEORY OF COMMERCE POWER UNDERLYING THE
NEW GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT

The revised Gun-Free School Zones Act is premised on the
supposition that the movement of a gun in interstate commerce is
itself a constitutionally adequate basis for Congress to regulate the
gun's subsequent possession in a school. Although this premise
emerges from a straightforward reading of the Court's opinion in
Lopez, the fix will be objectionable to many, on a number of
grounds. Those objections, and the responses to them, illuminate
the contours of the commerce power.
A. Doctrinal Objection
It first might be objected that the legislative fix fails in its
goal of bringing the act within the doctrinal boundaries delineated
in Lopez. According to this objection, the new statute would not
come within category I or HI because it would regulate the local
possession of guns that have previously moved in interstate commerce rather than regulating the actual transportation of guns across
state lines. As a doctrinal matter, this objection is weak because
the Court has made clear-in a series of cases that Lopez leaves
undisturbed,'s that the power to regulate objects under the Com-

ferent sort of example, Congress might have the power to regulate a school-zone possession of a firearm that had never moved in interstate commerce if, as a result of exceptional circumstances, the particular possession itself substantially affected interstate commerce. For example, the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995
involved the possession of an explosive device that itself substantially affected interstate
commerce. Rather than attempting to list all of the circumstances in which Congress
might have the power to regulate a school-zone possession of a firearm that has never
moved in interstate commerce, the revised Act relies on the catch-all provision. Thus, any
possession of a firearm in a school zone that Congress can regulate under any aspect of
its commerce power "otherwise affects" interstate commerce in the relevant sense. The
important point for present purposes is that the phrase "otherwise affects" should not be
taken as a reference to the substantial effects test, which is applicable only to regulation
of intrastate activities.
25. See 115 S. Ct. at 1627-28 (approvingly reviewing precedents on Commerce Clause
based regulation of intrastate activities). See also United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199,
1211 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that Lopez did not disturb Scarborough and other Supreme
Court precedents authorizing Congress to regulate the possession of any firearm that has
travelled in interstate commerce).
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merce Clause may be based on the fact that they have been or will
be transported across state lines.
In United States v. Darby,26 for example, the Court determined that federal minimum wage and maximum hour standards
with respect to employees engaged in production of goods for
interstate commerce could be sustained independently of statutory
provisions prohibiting the interstate shipment of articles produced in
violation of the standards.27 As to things that have previously
moved across state lines, the Court in United States v. Sullivan's
had little difficulty upholding under the commerce power a statutory provision that prohibited certain acts, such as misbranding, with
respect to drugs that had previously been shipped in interstate
commerce.
Most relevant for present purposes, the Court in Scarborough
v. United States29 necessarily, if implicitly, held that Congress has
the power to regulate guns that have traveled in interstate commerce. The case required that the Court interpret a statutory requirement that possession of a firearm be "in commerce or affecting commerce." The Court resolved the statutory interpretation
question by deciding that the statute was coextensive with
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the
possession of firearms. The federal felon-in-possession statute
makes it a crime for a felon to "possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm."3' The specific issue in Scarborough was whether a
firearm's having previously traveled in interstate commerce was
sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required link to interstate
commerce. The Court interpreted the broad "in or affecting
commerce" language of the statute to reach to the limits of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.3' The Court went
on to hold that the requirement of a connection between possession
of a gun and interstate commerce was satisfied by the gun's having
previously traveled in interstate commerce. 2 Because the Court's
interpretation of the statute depended on its finding that the statute

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

312 U.S. 100 (1941).
Id. at 122.
332 U.S. 689, 697 (1948).
431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
431 U.S. at 571-72.
See id. at 572-73.
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had the same reach as the commerce power, the decision
necessarily establishes that the commerce power reaches to the
possession of any gun that has traveled in interstate commerce.
Thus, the Court's Commerce Clause decisions-in particular
Scarborough--clearly reach
far enough
to secure
the
constitutionality of the revised act; how much further they may
reach we will develop below.33
B. Objection that the Fix is Formalistic
Although the fix is effective at the doctrinal level, it still
strikes many commentators as objectionable at a deeper level. This
objection is based on the notion that the legislative fix is formalistic: the fix adds a contrived connection to interstate commerce, but
at bottom the revised statute would accomplish the same thing as
the original act.
Careful scrutiny reveals that the objection is less compelling
than it may at first appear. We begin with a rough version of the
objection and progressively refine it in order to bring it onto the
strongest possible footing.
In general terms, the objection might be put as follows:
The original act criminalized the possession of guns in
school. Lopez decided that Congress lacked the power to
pass such legislation. Since almost every gun has moved in
interstate commerce, the revised act would ban the same
conduct as the original act. If Congress lacks the power explicitly to prohibit guns in school, it must lack the power
to pass legislation that would have the effect of prohibiting
guns in school. It would be formalistic to allow that adding
a few words that would have almost no effect on the scope
of the statute could enable Congress to accomplish something that would otherwise be beyond its constitutional
powers.
The objection, in other words, is that the revised act would do
exactly the same thing as the original act. Therefore, if Congress
does not have the power to enact the original act, it should not
have the power to enact the revised act.34

33. See infra Part II.C.
34. A related argument might be that the Court's decision in Lopez has already established that Congress lacks the power to regulate guns in schools under category I or II of
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One obvious response is that the revised act does not do exact-

ly the same thing as the original act; it applies to only a subset,
though admittedly a very large subset, of the gun possessions to

which the original act applies. At least a few guns will never have
moved in interstate commerce before being possessed in a school.
Such a response actually brings out the crux of the objection.
The objector thinks that it would be formalistic for fundamental
questions about Congress's power to depend on such a trivial matter as whether a statute covers a few more cases; the revised statute would still accomplish what Congress tried unsuccessfully to
accomplish in the first place. Thus, the objection can be restated:
Even if the revised act would have a slightly different
scope from the original act, Congress's purpose is the
same-to prevent guns in school. Whether Congress has
the power to accomplish this purpose should depend on
something more fundamental than the difference between
the scope of the original and revised acts.
So refined, the objection at its core involves Congress's purpose. The thrust of the objection is that whether Congress has the
power to accomplish something should depend on what its purpose
is, not on the specific details of how it goes about translating that
purpose into statutory language. Purpose in this objection could be
either of two different notions. First, it could be Congress's mod-

Commerce Clause authority. After all, the Court easily rejected any idea that the original
statute could be upheld under category I or n. 115 S. Ct. at 1630 ("The first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of."). If categories I and H permit Congress to
regulate the possession of any firearm that has passed in interstate commerce, the Court
might have been expected to invalidate only those few applications of the original statute
in which the firearm has not passed in interstate commerce, rather than the entire statute.
The argument, however, puts far too much weight on the Court's cursory dismissal of
categories I and II. In fact, the Court's opinion reveals no consideration of the possibility
of selectively evaluating the statute's applications according to whether the gun had previously passed in interstate commerce. Rather, the opinion takes it as a given that the act
"is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce," and rejects the
possibility, in the absence of legislative direction, of case-specific adjudication. Id. at
1630-31. (Noting the act "contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through
case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.").
Moreover, the Court approvingly cites Bass as a case in which, unlike Lopez, the statute
contained a jurisdictional element limiting its reach to firearm possessions with an explicit
connection to interstate commerce. Id. at 1631. Thus, the decision cannot plausibly be
read to have already rejected the position that a gun's movement in interstate commerce
provides an adequate basis for its regulation.
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vation-in the sense of the psychological explanation for why
members of Congress voted for the legislation. Second, purpose
could be the statute's aim-what the words of the statute, in the
circumstances, are well-suited to achieve.
If the objection is understood in terms of motivation, it is
easily parried. There are important reasons why the nature of
Congress's motivation-assuming that the motivation is not independently illegitimate (such as a racially discriminatory motivation)-is not relevant to Congress's power to enact a statute that
would otherwise be within the commerce power. Not only is it
difficult to ascertain the motivation of a member of Congress, but
each member may simultaneously have several motivations. (And
of course, since different members who vote for a statute would
differ in their motivations, it is not clear what it would mean for
there to be a single joint motivation for Congress's action.) More
importantly, it is difficult to see why the actual psychological processes of members of Congress should have any bearing on whether a statute is within the commerce power."
In contrast, understanding the objection's reliance on
Congress's purpose in the second sense-in terms of aim rather
than motivation--does not accord any relevance to the psychological processes of members of Congress. The aim of a statute is the
goal or effect the statute as written is best understood as trying to
accomplish. (Note that a statute can have more than one aim since
the statutory language can be well calculated to accomplish
different things.) Purpose in this sense is the ordinary notion of
legislative intent that courts and lawyers routinely rely on in statutory interpretation. Essentially, they ask what the words of the statute mean (as opposed to what the legislators who used them
actually had in mind), i.e., what purpose the words of the statute
are well calculated to accomplish.36
In this relevant sense of purpose, then, a purpose, or aim, of
the original Gun-Free School Zones Act is to combat the possession of guns in school. Restated, the objection is then that the new

35. Cf Sonzinsky v. United States,
preme Court is not free to speculate as
36. ANrroNN SCAuA, A MATrER OF
objective of statutory interpretation is
would gather from the text of the law,
ris").

300 U.S. 506, 556 (1937) (noting that "the Suto motives").
INTERPRErATION 17, 144 (1997) (arguing that the
to discern "the intent that a reasonable person
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus ju-
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act has basically the same aim as the original act. Like its unconstitutional predecessor, the revised act has the purpose of combatting the possession of guns in school. Having the same purpose,
the statute should have the same constitutional infirmity.
This objection is effective only if the constitutional defect in
the original act was in its aim. The objector needs to maintain that
Congress lacked power to enact the original statute because its
purpose was not one that is sanctioned by the commerce power.
Under this view, the problem with the original act was that its
purpose was to combat guns in school, and not to regulate interstate commerce. And whatever tenuous connections to interstate
commerce lawyers can contrive, the revised act would still be
trying to address guns in school, not interstate commerce.37
This formulation of the objection finds some apparent support
in the Lopez decision. The tone of the majority opinion suggests a
basic problem with what Congress is trying to do, not a minor
defect in the drafting of the statute that could be corrected by
slightly contracting the statute's coverage. For example, when the
Court asserts that "[the act] is a criminal statute that by its terms
has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms," the Court
backs up the assertion with a footnote suggesting that what Congress is trying to accomplish is outside its proper realm:
Under our federal system, the "'States possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."'
When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as
criminal by the States, it effects a "'change in the sensitive
' 38
relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.'
And the opinion buttresses this suggestion by quoting a criticism of
the act by then President Bush:
Most egregiously, [the act] inappropriately overrides legitimate state firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law. The policies reflected in these provisions could legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be
39
imposed upon the States by Congress.
37. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman) ("From a
purely formal look at the Constitution, it is hard to see how gun possession in school
qualifies as 'Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States .... .
38. 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3 (citations omitted).
39. Id. (quoting Statement of President George Bush on Signing the Crime Control Act
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Notwithstanding these few signs of encouragement in the Lopez
opinion, the objection runs into the problem that it relies on a view
of the way in which the Commerce Clause allocates power to Congress that was long ago rejected by the Supreme Court. This view,
which might be called a "purpose-based view," would hold that
Congress's powers-or at least its powers under the Commerce
Clause-are defined in terms of purposes rather than in terms of
subject matters. Whether Congress has the power to enact a particular statute would thus depend on what Congress is trying to
achieve in enacting the statute. According to a purpose-based view,
then, the commerce power is the power to regulate for certain
purposes---"interstate-commerce purposes"--and an important part
of the Supreme Court's task in interpreting the Commerce Clause
is essentially to identify and elaborate those purposes.'
The contrary view holds that the Constitution gives Congress
the power to regulate particular subjects or areas, regardless of its
aims. On this view, Congress may regulate any aspect of interstate
commerce without regard to its purpose in doing so. For example,
Congress could use the interstate commerce power to attack poverty, prevent crime, or protect civil rights.41
Although the Court at one time adopted a purpose-based view,
it long ago reversed course, and the subject-based view is now
firmly established. Few would question that Congress can use the
commerce power to address noncommercial problems, for example
racial discrimination. But at least judging from criticisms of certain
federal criminal legislation, the-full implications of that position for
Commerce Clause theory, and in particular for a purpose-based
view of the clause, are not fully appreciated.

of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1944, 1945 (Nov. 29, 1990)).
40. Different versions of the purpose-based view could take different positions on the
question whether purpose is the only restricting factor or whether Congress's power is
also to some extent restricted by subject matter. The possible positions lie on a spectrum

from the extreme position that, so long as Congress's purpose is authorized by a constitutional grant of power, the statute is within the grant of power regardless of what subject
matter it regulates, to the opposite extreme position that Congress may only regulate cer-

tain authorized subject matters for certain authorized purposes.
41. This view says that the Commerce Clause does not require that Congress have
interstate commerce purposes in order to regulate under the commerce power, of course it
is a separate question if a statute is unconstitutional because Congress has an
independently illegitimate purpose, such as a racially discriminatory purpose.
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The purpose-based view was decisive in the Supreme Court's
decision in the Child Labor case, Hammer v. Dagenhart.42 The
issue in the case was whether Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the interstate transportation within thirty
days of manufacture of goods produced by child labor. The Court
concluded that the prohibition was unconstitutional. Justice Day,
writing for the Court, reasoned:
The thing intended to be accomplished by this statute is the
denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those
manufacturers in the States who employ children within the
prohibited ages. The act in its effect does not regulate
transportation among the States, but aims to standardize
the ages at which children may be employed in mining and
manufacturing within the States.43
Thus, the Court found that Congress could not regulate an activity
that was undeniably interstate commerce-the transportation of
certain goods across state lines-because the act's purpose was not
to control interstate transportation but to control the age at which
children may be employed.
Justice Holmes's dissent (which set out the position the Court
was later to adopt in Darby) responded that whether a statute is
within Congress's power does not depend on Congress's purpose.
As a general matter, in deciding whether a statute is within
Congress's constitutional powers, the court is not called on to
determine whether the statute's purpose is one that the Constitution
authorizes." Holmes relied upon cases interpreting Congress's taxing power.
Congress levied a tax upon [oleomargarine] when colored
so as to resemble butter that was so great as obviously to
prohibit the manufacture and sale. In a very elaborate discussion the present Chief Justice excluded any inquiry into
the purpose of an act which apart from that purpose was
within the power of Congress.... Fifty years ago a tax
on state banks, the obvious purpose and actual effect of
which was to drive them, or at least their circulation, out

42. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
43. 247 U.S. at 271-72 (emphasis added).
44. 247 U.S. at 277-78 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of existence, was sustained, although the result was one
that Congress had no constitutional power to require. The
Court made short work of the argument as to the purpose
of the act. "The judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative
department of the government limitations upon the exercise
of its acknowledged powers."'4
The Court in Darby made the point even more plainly:
[Regulation excluding from commerce articles that Congress
conceives to be injurious] is not a forbidden invasion of
state power merely because either its motive or its consequence is to restrict the use of articles of commerce within
the state of destination; and is not prohibited unless by
other Constitutional provisions .... The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for
the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the
Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts
are given no control.... Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some
constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause.... In the
more than a century which has elapsed since the decision
of Gibbons v. Ogden, these principles of constitutional
interpretation have been so long and repeatedly recognized
by this Court as applicable to the Commerce Clause, that
there would be little occasion for repeating them now were
it not for the decision of this Court twenty-two years ago
in Hammer v. Dagenhart.'
Since Darby, the Court has consistently rejected the purposebased view, holding that a congressional purpose to control or
affect matters other than interstate commerce does not undermine a
statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. Most fa-

45. Id.(quoting Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1868)). In commenting on the
Child Labor case in a letter to Learned Hand, Holmes explained: "In my opinion Congress may have whatever ulterior motives they please if the act passed in the immediate
aspect is within their powers-though personally, were I a legislator I might think it
dishonest to use powers in that way." Letter from Holmes to Learned Hand, quoted in
Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 27
STAN. L. Rnv. 719, 760 (1975).
46. 312 U.S. at 114-15.
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mously, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,47 the Court
held that the Commerce Clause authorized the enactment of Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination and
segregation in the use of public accommodation on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin.48 It was undisputed that
the "fundamental object of [the act] was to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments."'"' However, the Court deemed
that purpose irrelevant to the question of the act's constitutionality.
The Court reasoned that Congress could regulate those effects of
racial discrimination that were within the subject matter of interstate commerce even if its purpose in doing so was to address a
moral and social problem rather than a commercial one.5 °
Under reigning Supreme Court doctrine, then, the purposebased view has lost out to the subject-based view of congressional
power. Thus, the purpose of the new Gun-Free School Zones Act
is irrelevant to whether the act is within the commerce power.
Consequently, the objection that Congress's purpose in enacting the
revised act is the same as its purpose in enacting the original act
does not get off the ground. Since it was not Congress's purpose
that constituted the defect in the original act, the same purpose
would no more be a defect in the revised act.
Appraised under the governing subject-based view, the revised
act is plainly constitutional. The revised act regulates only guns
that have moved in or otherwise affect interstate commerce. The
Court has long accepted that the commerce power extends to the
regulation of objects that have moved in interstate commerce. And
the "otherwise affects" statutory language cannot impair the act's
constitutionality because the Court has construed that language
simply to track the boundary of Congress's Commerce Clause pow51
er.
At this point, the objector might concede that the subject-based
view of congressional power is firmly established but argue that

47. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
48. See id. at 247.
49. Id at 250; see id. at 291 (Goldberg, J.,concurring) (emphasizing that the purpose
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the vindication of human dignity and not mere

economics).
50. See id. at 256 (holding that as long as the conduct sufficiently affects interstate
commerce, Congress may legislate against moral wrongs).
51. See supra note 24.
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the purpose-based view would provide a better interpretation of the

Constitution.52 The argument would now run as follows:
The Commerce Power was given to Congress so that it
could accomplish specific purposes, such as to provide for
uniform standards and to protect the channels of interstate
commerce from parochial interference. Why should Congress be able to accomplish purposes other than those for

which the power was included in the Constitution?
Indeed, despite the Court's express rejection of the purpose-based
view in its Commerce Clause cases, the argument would continue,
the overall pattern of results in those cases might be understood in
terms of that view. Rather than attempting to find a way of characterizing the scope of Congress's commerce power in terms of subject matters, the Court might better rationalize the pattern of its
decisions as embodying a principle that the commerce power gives
Congress the power to enact regulations that are rationally related
to achieving the purposes for which the commerce power was
created, such as protecting and regulating interstate commerce and
preventing it from causing injury and undermining state policies.
There is no general reason that the Constitution could not be
understood to allocate power in this way. The copyright power, for
example, expressly grants Congress power to achieve specified
ends.53 And the Court has interpreted the taxing and spending
powers to be limited to certain, albeit very extensive, purposes.5 4

52. Professor Regan adopts something like this position in an article on Lopez in the
University of Michigan Symposium on the case. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think
About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REV. 554, 555-557 (1995) (arguing, for example, that "there is all the difference
in the world between Congress's legislating against lotteries just because it disapproves of
them and Congress's legislating against lotteries to help the states give effect to their own
judgements of disapproval").
53. "Congress shall have Power to . . . promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. The courts have decided that it is beyond the scope of Congress's power to lay
punitive taxes. And whether a tax is punitive depends, under the prevailing doctrine, on
whether there are revenue-raising purposes for the tax, regardless of whether or not the
tax imposes a burden or deters activity. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953); Zwak v. United States, 848 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1988). Similarly, Congress has
wide latitude in using the spending power as an inducement to encourage states to undertake certain actions, but Congress may not use the spending power for a coercive purpose. See S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987).
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Even if the purpose-based view were the best interpretation of
the Constitution (i.e., even if the Interstate Commerce Clause were
best understood as allocating power to Congress to accomplish certain purposes rather than to regulate certain subject matters) the
revised act would still be a valid exercise of the commerce power.
As the next section details, the revised act has a purpose that
would be sanctioned by any reasonable purpose-based view of the
Commerce Clause. This purpose, which is overlooked or slighted
by many critics, is to prevent interstate commerce from contributing to the problem of guns in school.
1. The Commerce Purpose of the Revised Act
The revised act makes it a federal crime to possess within one
thousand feet of a school a firearm that "has moved in or other'
Opponents of the act justifiwise affects interstate commerce."55
ably point out the strain in trying to discern in the act a direct
commercial purpose (i.e., a purpose to regulate or advance the
national economy or the commercial relations between the
States). 6 The broad problem at which the statute is directed is,
rather, one of public safety-the possession of guns in school. And
it is elementary that the Constitution does not provide a general
federal police power to promote health and safety. Thus, the purpose of the act, an advocate of a purpose-based view might argue,
is one that is not encompassed by the Constitution.
The flaw in this argument is its unjustified move from the
absence under the commerce power of a general power to promote
health and safety to the conclusion that Congress may never act
under the commerce power to promote health and safety. This
conclusion does not follow as a matter of logic. And as a matter
of fact, under any plausible purpose-based view of the Commerce
Clause, the commerce power would not be restricted to commercial
purposes. A purpose-based view of the Commerce Clause would
not of course sanction a general purpose of promoting health or

55. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
56. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 4 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman). The
federal government nevertheless attempted to defend the Gun-Free School Zones Act in
the Supreme Court in part by describing a chain of effects starting from the possession of
guns in schools and culminating in a reduction in the nation's economic competitiveness.
See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995).
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safety, but it would sanction certain specific, noncommercial health
and safety purposes.
A purpose-based view would, for example, have to sanction a
congressional purpose of preventing interstate commerce from carrying injurious articles. A restriction to commercial purposes would
not even allow Congress to ban the shipment of bombs across state
lines, since the purpose of such a prohibition would not be commercial. The problems caused by interstate transport of injurious
articles (which are largely problems of local health and safety) can
be adequately addressed only at the national level. States cannot
regulate the shipment of harmful objects from other states, and
prohibiting the possession of the objects within the state may be
ineffective if the objects are readily shipped to many different
locations within the state.
Indeed, the courts have long recognized the importance of
Congress's having the ability to use to commerce power to prevent
interstate commerce from contributing to local harms. Thus, in the
Lottery Case, Champion v. Ames, 7 the Court approved Congress's
use of the commerce power to suppress state lotteries:
[Congress] said, in effect, that it would not permit the
declared policy of the States, which sought to protect their
people against the mischiefs of the lottery business, to be
overthrown or disregarded by the agency of interstate commerce. We should hesitate long before adjudging that an
evil of such appalling character, carried on through interstate commerce, cannot be met and crushed by the only
power competent to that end.5"
Moreover, in the period when the Court was applying a purpose-based view, the Court recognized that the purpose of preventing interstate commerce from being the vehicle of injury to public

57. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
58. Id. at 357-358; see also Hearings, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of David Strauss)
("The principle that Congress may seek to prevent interstate commerce from being used
as a means of bringing about an evil within the states has been reaffirmed repeatedly by
the Supreme Court."); see also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 279 (1918) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) ("It does not matter whether the supposed evil precedes or follows the
transportation. It is enough that in the opinion of Congress the transportation encourages
the evil."); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 321-23 (1913) (upholding White Slavery
Act of 1910); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 50 (1911) (recognizing
Congress's power to regulate the shipping of adulterated eggs even before shipment).
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health and safety was appropriate. In McDermott v. Wisconsin,59
for example, the Court noted that "Congress may determine for
itself the character of the means necessary to make its purpose
effectual in preventing the shipment in interstate commerce of
articles of a harmful character." Thus, any tenable purpose-based
view should allow that Congress may use the commerce power to
prevent interstate commerce from being the vehicle for injury to
health and safety in the receiving state.
The revised act would therefore be valid even under a purposebased view. Since guns are manufactured in only a few states,
nearly all guns in school have had to travel in interstate commerce
to arrive where they are. An aim of the revised act-an effect that
the statute is well-calculated to achieve-is to prevent interstate
commerce from contributing to the problem of guns in school. The
revised act is reasonably calculated to help prevent interstate commerce from contributing to this problem because it bans the very
aspect of the problem that results from interstate commerce-the
possession in schools of guns that have moved in interstate commerce. The act therefore accomplishes a purpose that on a purposebased view should be considered within the commerce power.
2. Primary v. Secondary Purposes
The objector might make two further objections to this argument. First, the objector may insist that even if preventing interstate commerce from contributing to guns in schools is a purpose
of the revised act, it is a secondary purpose; the real or primary
purpose is simply to combat guns in schools. (This argument is
related to the claim that any Commerce Clause purpose to the
revised act is "purely pretextual."6' 1) Second, even if the purpose
of preventing interstate commerce from contributing to the problem
of guns in schools is a purpose of the revised act that is appropriately advanced within the commerce power, the prohibition in
schools of guns that have ever moved in interstate commerce is too
tenuously linked to that purpose.
The idea that a statute should be within the commerce power
only if its primary purpose is a commerce purpose is easily countered. So long as a statute is reasonably calculated to achieve a

59. 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
60. Id. at 135.
61. Hearings, supra note 9, at 4 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman).
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Commerce Clause purpose, it should not matter that Congress had
other purposes, even more prominent purposes, having nothing to
do with interstate commerce. First, there may often be no fact of
the matter as to which of Congress's purposes are primary or principal. A statute may be well calculated to accomplish several aims
at different levels of generality, and there may be no reason to
hold that one of those aims is more genuinely or dominantly the
statute's purpose. Second, partly as a result of this first point, the
inquiry into what is the principal or primary effect of a statute is
inherently subject to manipulation. Third, since whether a purpose,
in the relevant sense, is primary or secondary depends on how well
calculated the statute is to achieve that purpose as opposed to other
purposes, a doctrine that a statute with a perfectly acceptable commerce purpose was not within the commerce power because of
other purposes that the statute was more precisely tailored to accomplish would impose something like the narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny on Commerce Clause enactments. Such
a doctrine would greatly restrict legislative decision making, effectively empowering the courts to review legislative decisions for
their effectiveness in promoting commerce power goals.62

62. The discussion above suggests a potential reinterpretation of Supreme Court doctrine in a way that would incorporate some consideration of congressional purpose. As
reformulated, the doctrine would be that the statute must have at least some ancillary
purpose that is within the purposes for which the commerce power was granted. This
interpretation would modify, but would not fundamentally change, the current doctrine,
that the Court will not inquire into whether the statute's purpose is within the purposes
for which the commerce power was granted in deciding whether a statute is within the
commerce power. The modification would be that, while the primary purpose of the statute (assuming it is not independently illegitimate) has no bearing on whether the statute is
a legitimate exercise of the commerce power, the statute must still have some purpose
that is within the purposes for which the power was granted. This interpretation would
both maintain the appeal of the purpose-based doctrine that Congress should not be able,
under the Commerce Clause, to enact statutes that do not have a purpose for which the
commerce power was granted, and avoid the problems with the doctrine that a statute's
primary purpose must be a commerce purpose. The interpretation would make sense of
the Court's insistence that the fact that a statute has a purpose that Congress is not authorized to pursue is irrelevant to whether the statute is valid under the commerce power.
This insistence could be premised on an assumption that the statute has some other, authorized purpose. And this interpretation would make sense of Holmes's notion of a
statute's being "apart from that purpose . . . within the power of Congress." Hammer,
247 U.S. at 277-78. Thus, the doctrine as reformulated would be not that Congress's
purpose does not matter if Congress has power, determined independently of purpose, but
that Congress's other purposes do not matter if Congress is trying to accomplish some
purpose that is within the commerce power.
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Moreover, even leaving aside the theoretical problems with the
primary purpose objection, its application to the revised act seems
strained. As noted above, a purpose-based view would have to
sanction the use of the commerce power to prevent interstate commerce from being a cause of a health and safety problem. Thus, if
the primary purpose that the objector identifies-to combat the
problem of guns in school-is an acceptable purpose, because
interstate commerce is a cause of the problem. So even if in general a statute is within the commerce power only if its primary purpose is an appropriate interstate commerce purpose, the revised act
is on firm ground.
There is likewise a straightforward answer to the second potential objection-that the link is too tenuous between the purpose
(preventing interstate commerce from contributing to the health and
safety problems caused by guns in school) and the statutory means
of serving that purpose (making it a federal crime to possess guns
in school). On the contrary, given the legislative options, preventing the possession of guns at the end of the interstate commerce
stream is a fairly direct way to effectuate the statutory purpose. It
would not be feasible or effective to police interstate borders in an
attempt to seize the guns at the point of passage. In addition, since
there is no way to know which guns are destined to wind up in
schools, 63 any such attempt to restrict guns from crossing borders
would be exceedingly overbroad; it would be far more tenuously
connected to the purpose than is the regulation of possession of
guns in school (as well as incidentally sweeping in the guns whose
subsequent possession is fully lawful). The most sensible focus of
regulation is where the problem is actuated, at the point of possession in schools, rather than at the point of actual crossing.Y
Thus, objections premised on Congress's purpose in enacting
the revised act should not prevail. We may demur to the sense of
critics that the statute, in the main, is "really" about preventing the
possession of guns in school, not regulating commerce as such. As
a doctrinal matter, what the statute is intended to accomplish is
irrelevant to the inquiry of whether it is a valid exercise of the

63. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Professor David Strauss).
64. Thus, the revised act is a fairly narrowly tailored attack on the problem of interstate commerce's contribution to the presence guns in schools, although as noted, see
supra note 60, there is no requirement of narrow tailoring to address a health and safety
problem caused by interstate commerce.
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commerce power. But even if an exercise of the commerce power
required an acceptable Commerce Clause purpose, the purpose of
combatting guns in school would satisfy that requirement.
C. The Criticism that the Fix Would Authorize a
Limitless Commerce Power
A final important objection to the Gun-Free School Zones Act
is that if the act is constitutional there remains no effective limit
on Congress's commerce power. The revised act bases the use of
the commerce power to regulate guns in school on the fact that the
guns have crossed state lines. Almost every transaction involves
some person or thing that has crossed state lines. Consequently, the
objection goes, if Congress can, under the commerce power, regulate an activity merely because a person or thing involved in the
activity has once crossed state lines, the commerce power is effectively transformed into a general police power.
The opinion in Lopez manifests that the Court felt the force of
this objection.' The concluding paragraph of the opinion begins,
"To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States."'
Critics of both the old and new acts argue that if Congress
can, in the name of interstate commerce, regulate guns in school,
then, given the interconnectedness of the modem national economy,
there is nothing it cannot regulate under the Commerce Clause. As
Professor Friedman urged in his Senate testimony in opposition to
the legislative fix: "Just because something travels in interstate
commerce should not, standing alone, justify congressional regulation... for almost everything travels in interstate commerce to67
day.
Opponents illustrate the point with hypothetical statutes based
on the movement of goods across state lines in which the goods

65. See Stewart, Symposium, United States v. Lopez: A Governmental Perspective,
University of Idaho College of Law (Feb. 3, 1996).
66. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995). Similarly, the Court criticized Justice Breyer's dis-

sent on the ground that his acceptance of the Government's rationale would place no
limitations on Congress's commerce power. "Thus, if we were to accept the Government's
arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate." Id. at 1632.
67. Hearings, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman).
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are only trivially or incidentally related to the activity being regulated. At the Senate subcommittee hearing on S.890, for example,
Senator Thompson posed the hypothetical of a statute that made it
a crime to possess a gun any part of which, including the paint,
had ever passed in interstate commerce. Such a statute likely would
cover virtually every gun in the nation because some part or component of the gun would have originated in another state. Even
more broadly, Professor Beale raises the specter that Congress
could federalize any crime by passing a statute making it a federal
offense to violate under any state law while wearing clothing that
had ever passed in interstate commerce.' If validated, the approach of basing Commerce Clause authority on interstate movement of an item that is only incidentally related to the regulated
activity would permit commerce-power based regulation of nearly
all behavior.69
Another kind of example involves cases in which federal jurisdiction is premised on a movement of goods in interstate commerce that is vanishingly remote in time from the commission of
the criminal offense. Typical is a hypothetical case in which a
prosecution is brought under a federal firearms statute requiring
that a gun have moved in interstate commerce, and the gun in
question last crossed state lines decades before the alleged criminal
violation. Although even opponents do not suggest there is a clean
line, at some point the connection of the regulated activity to interstate commerce may seem too attenuated to ground Commerce
Clause authority.

68. Professor Sarah Sun Beale, Address at the Case Western Reserve Law Review
Symposium: The New Federalism after United States v. Lopez (Nov. 10, 1995).
69. Contrary to what some commentators seem to assume, the mere fact that a Commerce Clause theory results in an extremely broad commerce power does not show that
the theory is wrong. As the country changes, the scope of the commerce power changes,
and nothing in the Clause appears to support a limit on what areas may be regulated if
they become appropriately involved with interstate commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (Marshall, CJ.) (noting that the commerce power is "complete in
itself... and acknowledg[es] no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution'; infra. Part llI.A. It is conceivable that the country may eventually become so
economically interdependent that the commerce power would extend to allareas of activi-

ty (subject of course to other constitutional restrictions). In other words, what is wrong
with the hypothetical paint and clothing statutes is not that they regulate activities that are
necessarily outside the reach of the commerce power, but that they lack an appropriate
basis to regulate those activities.
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The objection is less an analytical attack on the act than an
expression of queasiness about the prospect of an unlimited commerce power. The notion behind the objection is that the act can
be validated only on a theory of Commerce Clause authority that
leaves no room for a principled stopping place short of a general
federal police power. The act could thus be defended on its own
merits, as in Part ll.A., by showing that the Court's precedents
make clear that the movement of a firearm in interstate commerce
(at least if not too remote in time) is a sufficient basis for federal
regulation of the firearm's possession. Thus, since the act rests on
a well-established source of Commerce Clause authority, the act
could be upheld while leaving the problem of delineating the outer
limits of the commerce power for another day. Even if the paint or
clothing hypothetical would cross some as-yet undefined boundary
because the connection between interstate commerce and the
regulated activity is too attenuated, the act's regulation of the possession of firearms that have crossed state lines is on the safe side
of the line.
Although the act can be defended in this way, without providing an account of precisely how far the commerce power reaches,
the theory of the commerce power on which the revised act relies
does not imply an unbounded commerce power. The rest of this
section clarifies the contours of the commerce power under this
theory, in the process providing a fuller response to the objection.
The objection presupposes that the revised act depends on a
theory of the commerce power according to which an item's mere
passage in interstate commerce provides a sufficient basis for regulating any transaction in which that item later makes an appearance. In other words, such regulation is valid no matter how attenuated or incidental the connection between the passage in interstate
commerce and the regulated transaction.
Since the revision of the act simply adds a requirement of a
passage in interstate commerce, 7° it is understandable that the
revised act might be taken to rest on such a theory. In fact, however, the theory behind the act is far more narrow and
distinguishes the revised act from the objector's hypothetical
statutes. As developed below, the revised act is valid not because it
regulates transactions involving items that once moved in interstate

70. See supra note 18.
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commerce but because it addresses a harm of which the movement
of items across state lines is a cause. Whatever the outer limits on
the commerce power, the use of the power to regulate harms of
which interstate commerce is a cause is straightforward'
The objector might here interject that in the case of the hypothetical statutes as well, the interstate movement is no less a cause
of the harm because the harm would not have occurred but for the
interstate movement. In the case of the paint statute, for example,
the passage of the paint in interstate commerce might also be
considered a cause of the gun's possession: had the paint never
crossed state lines, the gun in question would not have been possessed, at least not in the form in which is was possessed, paint
and all. 2 On this view, the hypothetical statutes would in principle be indistinguishable from the revised act.
Such a position, however, relies on a special and exceedingly
expansive notion of cause. Every occurrence has an indefinite number of necessary or "but-for" causes--events but for which the occurrence would not taken place. For example, the but-for causes of
a car accident might include the rain that made the road slick, the
incident at work that delayed the driver, the telephone call a year
before that brought the driver to the city, the birth of the driver's
great grandparents, and so on. But-for causes not only reach back
into the past, but include the unbounded number of conditions at
the time of the occurrence without which it would not have taken
place: for example, the absence of an immensely strong net that
would have caught the car before it left the road.
Because but-for causation is so undiscriminating, it is typically
not the most serviceable notion of causation. In ordinary contexts,
for example, answering a question about the causes of a car
accident with facts about the birth of the driver's great
grandparents would be bizarre. It would be equally inappropriate in
most instances to say that the availability of gasoline caused a car
accident, or even that it was a cause of an accident, though no car

71. Putting this point within the terms of Lopez, a statute should be understood to
regulate a person or thing in interstate commerce or the channels of interstate commerce-and thus to come within the categories of authority identified in the decision-whenever the interstate movement of the thing or use of the channels is a cause of
the harm addressed by the statute.
72. Actually it is highly questionable whether the movements in interstate commerce of
paint and clothing are "but-for" causes of the relevant harms within the best understanding

of the notion of but-for causation. See infra note 77.
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accident would happen without gasoline. As these examples
illustrate, the ordinary, common sense notion of the cause of an
occurrence is more discriminating that but-for causation. It is this
familiar notion, and not mere but-for causation, that is employed
by laypersons and lawyers in most contexts; it is what we normally
mean by "cause." Thus, the initial concern misses the mark by assuming a nonordinary notion of causation.
Although the ordinary notion of causation-the notion that the
theory behind the revised act employs-is familiar and easily applied in most cases, it is notoriously difficult to articulate with
complete precision the implicit standards according to which we
apply that notion. There is in fact an extensive philosophical literature on the question, which largely concludes that it may not be
possible to specify these standards fully.73 One reason for this
difficulty, as the literature outlines, is that what counts as an ordinary cause, as opposed to a mere but-for cause, depends on the
purposes and context of the inquiry. 4 For example, when a forest
fire breaks out, the appropriate answer (for most ordinary purposes
and in most contexts) to the question of what caused the fire is the
carelessly tossed cigarette rather than the presence of oxygen, despite the fact that the presence of oxygen is no less a but-for cause
of the fire.
Since the ordinary notion of causation is purpose- and contextdependent, application of the notion will inevitably turn on judgment and experience; there is no formula that can be used to mechanically generate answers to questions about causes. Relatedly, it
is inevitable that there will be borderline cases in which the determination of causation will be open to debate. No one suggests,
however, that the notion is consequently useless or empty. In fact,
we request and provide causal explanations all the time, in legal,
academic, and policy discussions as well as in everyday life. Moreover, the law in particular regularly employs notions-for example,
voluntariness, or prejudice, or negligence-that are plainly meaningful and readily applied in most cases even though they are
difficult to apply in borderline cases. The absence of a mechanical
formula for determining whether an event is a cause of another
occurrence is no great problem because we share a sufficiently

73. See, e.g., ALAN GARPINKEL, FORMS OF EXPLANATION (1981); Sylvain Bromberger,
An Approach to Explanation in ANALYrIc PHILOSOPHY (RJ. Butler ed., 2nd ser. 1965).
74. See David Lewis, Causal Explanation in I PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 214-40 (1986).
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clear understanding of the ordinary notion to apply it determinately
in a wide range of cases and to know what kinds of considerations

cut for and against its application in other cases. That is, we must
implicitly grasp fairly determinate, though difficult to specify, standards for applying the notion. If we did not, there would not be

general agreement in most circumstances on what is or is not a
satisfactory causal explanation, and the ordinary notion of causation
would not be as useful as it is in so many contexts.
Returning to the question of the use of the commerce power to
regulate transactions involving items that have moved in interstate
commerce, the paint and clothing statutes are premised on
movements in interstate commerce that are not generally causes of
the relevant harms.7' In fact, it is likely that the hypothetical
statutes seem so glaringly inappropriate precisely because the
movement of paint or clothing in interstate commerce is not a
cause of the prohibited conduct. It is questionable, in the first
place, whether the movement of the paint or clothing can even
properly be characterized as a but-for cause of the harm.76 In any
event, regardless of the outcome of the but-for analysis, the movement in interstate commerce of the paint and clothing are not
causes of the regulated conduct. In the case of the paint statute, it
is scarcely plausible to maintain that the movement of paint in
interstate commerce is a cause of the possession of guns. The
objection thus relies on a false analogy: the infimnity of the paint
75. It would be possible to frame crimes for which the movement of the clothing was
a cause in the ordinary sense of the term-for example the theft and transport of the
clothing itself or, perhaps, the use in an armed robbery of special bulletproof clothing
manufactured only in one state. Similarly, there would be some crimes--for example, the
defacement of public property with spray paint-for which the interstate transport of the
paint could well be a cause of the conduct. Such hypothetical applications only serve,
however, to illustrate the important distinction between an interstate movement of goods
that is a cause of the relevant harm, as opposed to one that is only incidentally related to
it.
76. Even if congress used its Commerce Clause authority to ban the interstate passage
of paint, for example, the very same guns could end up in school without paint or with
paint produced within the state. In contrast, but for their passage across state lines, guns
manufactured in other states could not be brought to school.
The determination of whether an event is a but-for cause is not always straightforward. The question a but-for standard poses is basically: would the event still have happened if everything had happened just as it did except that the putative but-for cause did
not occur. The difficulty is that in answering that question it may matter greatly why the
putative but-for cause did not occur. There are innumerable possible explanations, and
since there are no clear standards for choosing which explanation is the pertinent one, the
but-for analysis can present a vexing intellectual puzzle.

1997]

FEDERAL POWER AND FEDERALISM

953

and clothing statutes does not imply a similar infirmity in the
The interstate commerce in guns is certainly a butrevised act.
for cause of the harm-the possession of guns in school-that
Congress seeks to address because guns that originated in other
states would not be where they are if it were not for the interstate
movement of guns. Most guns are manufactured in one of two
states and are then shipped to other states. More to the point, few
would deny that the interstate traffic in guns is a cause in the ordinary sense of the problem of guns in schools. None of the
objectors, in fact, contest that point. Rather, they assume that the
basis of the revised act is the mere fact of an item's movement in
interstate commerce and thus do not even address the critical
causation distinction between the revised act and the hypothetical
statutes.
Thus, the hypothetical paint and clothing statutes are
distinguished from the revised act because, unlike the interstate
commerce in guns, the interstate commerce in paint and clothing
are not causes of the possession of guns in schools. The case of
the gun that last moved in interstate commerce a century ago is
more difficult. The movement of a gun across state lines that long
ago is, no less than its movement last month, a but-for cause of its
possession in the receiving state today: the possession would not
have come about but for the passage into the receiving state. But
where the passage is so removed from the. regulated behavior, the
responsibility of interstate commerce for the harm is tenuous, in
part because of the expanse of intervening but-for causes. At some
point, the connection between interstate commerce and the harm
might become too attenuated for interstate commerce to be
considered a cause of the harm, and, at that point, the passage in
interstate commerce would not support congressional authority to
regulate under the Commerce Clause. As a doctrinal, matter, the
recognition of such a limitation would, of course, entail revisiting
the conclusion of Scarbourough that the commerce power permits
regulation of a gun that has passed, however distantly, in interstate
commerce. More important for present purposes, the limitation
would not threaten federal regulation of guns in schools because it
would cover only the odd case in which the gun last crossed state
lines a particularly long time before the possession in school. It
therefore would not call into question the facial validity of a
provision such as the revised act; rather, it would at most threaten
the application of the statute in a very few extreme cases.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:921

An analogy to common law principles of liability is useful. A
punctilious reliance on but-for causation would identify for any
injury an indefinite number of actual causes. 7 Tort law excludes
overly remote but-for causes from legal responsibility for injury
through the notion of proximate cause. Thus, tort law requires as a
condition for recovery in negligence that the negligent act be not
only the but-for cause of the plaintiff's injury but also the proximate cause.78 Attempts to give a precise definition or mechanical
formula for the notion of proximate cause have been unsuccessful79 in part because the notion draws on ordinary notions of
causal responsibility. The notion is nevertheless readily applied in
the run of cases, and few would contend that it was meaningless. 0
In sum, the legislative fix does not rest on a theory of the
commerce power that would render it boundless. The outlandish
exercises of federal power that critics contend would be authorized
were the fix to be upheld are readily distinguished because, in
contrast to the legislative fix, they are based on movements in
interstate commerce that are not causes of the relevant harm. Even
if the new act potentially could be applied to some cases in which
the interstate commerce connection is too attenuated for interstate
commerce to be a cause of the harm, that possibility does not call
into question either the overall constitutionality of the new act or
the soundness of the theory of commerce power on which it rests.

m. LoPEZ,

FEDERALISM, AND THE FEDERALIZATION DEBATE

Many commentators have sounded a broader theme in assessing
the meaning and impact of Lopez, discerning beneath the surface of
the Court's opinion a growing frustration with congressional en77. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
78. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1986).

79. "Proximate" is defined in the tort law as a major or substantial cause, the cause
that "stands next in causation to the effect, not necessarily in time or space but in causal
relation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990); see also RESTATEmENT (SEC-

OND) OF TORTS § 432 (citing cases that require cause be a "substantial factor" in producing the injury rather than contributing "only slightly" to the result).
80. In fact, the lack of a precise formulation and the existence of difficult cases are
less problematic in Commerce Clause jurisprudence than in tort law. The notion of proximate cause in tort law, though it plainly draws heavily on the ordinary notion of causal
responsibility, is a technical legal notion and thus allows greater scope for argument that
it should take into account policy theories about what causes should be held responsible
for particular injuries.
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croachments on traditionally state areas. They view the decision as
only superficially about the commerce power, and more profoundly
about basic values of federalism. We first argue that Lopez cannot
be understood as a decision about federalism. Then, leaving aside
the question of how best to understand the Court's decision, we
consider some of the more prominent arguments that the act and
similar federal criminal legislation in traditionally state areas are
unwise and inappropriate uses of congressional power. We focus,
in particular, on recent expressions of concern from the federal
judiciary that federal criminal legislation is swamping the federal
courts with inappropriate cases and preventing the federal courts
from carrying out their important traditional functions.
A. Lopez as a Decision about Federalism.
A number of commentators have suggested that the chief significance of Lopez lies not in what it holds for the commerce
power, but in what it augurs for Court's approach to federalism.
Professor Brickey, for example, drawing on a footnote in the
Court's opinion, asserts that "[s]ounding strong federalism themes,
[Lopez] is a reminder that, contrary to contemporary thought ...
states have primary authority to define and enforce criminal laws,
and that much of what Congress has prioritized needlessly alters
the balance between federal and state jurisdiction.""1 Similarly,
Professor Kramer argues that the reason the Court rendered the
Lopez decision is that "the Court worried that Congress had been
neglecting its responsibility to safeguard federalism. [Lopez is] a
plea to take federalism seriously." 2 Even those commentators
who do not see Lopez as primarily a case about federalism still
tend to see federalism as an important theme in the case.

81. Brickey, supra note 8, at 842-43 & n.258.
82. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 11 (statement of Professor Larry Kramer); see also
Frickey, supra note 10, at 729 (noting that Lopez "could promote a meaningful dialogue . . . concerning important constitutional values of... federalism"); Hearings, supra
note 9, at 1 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman) (noting that the Commerce Clause

would not reach even the new act "because the regulation of guns in and around schools
is a job properly allocated to state and local governments, and thus is beyond the power
of the national Congress") (emphasis added); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of
Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L.
REv. 752, 802-05, 810-13 (1995). Professor Calabresi hales Lopez as a rare example of

the Court's determination that an activity falls outside the reach of the commerce power
because of the "historical and normative case that suggests that education and local law
enforcement are functions that we do well to leave to the states." Id. at 803.
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Commentators who portray the Lopez decision in federalism
terms can find some support for their view in the various opinions
in the case. Most notably, the concurrence of Justice Kennedy, appears to argue that the act is beyond the commerce power in part
because it interferes with a traditionally state concern:
The [act] forecloses the States from experimenting and
'exercising their own judgment... and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the
ordinary and usual sense of that term . . . [Therefore]
[w]hile the intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as
severe in this instance as in some of our recent Tenth
Amendment cases, the intrusion is nonetheless significant.
Absent a stronger connection or identification with commercial concerns that are central to the Commerce Clause,
that interference contradicts the federal balance the Framers

designed.83
In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court itself
included a notable aside about federalism, appending to the statement that the act "by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce'" a footnote stressing the states' "'primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law."' 84 The footnote, moreover, appears at the pivotal point in the opinion, where the Court
declares that the act "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce.'"98
Notwithstanding these passages, the commentators' interpretation cannot be accurate: although the opinions contain bromides on
the subject of federalism, as a matter of doctrine Lopez cannot be
about federalism values in the sense in which the commentators are
suggesting. A closer examination of what it might mean for a decision to be about federalism reveals the problem with the
commentators' interpretation.
In a broad, weak sense of federalism, a decision holding that
the commerce power does not authorize a particular statute is a
federalism decision. To say that such a decision is a federalism
decision in this broad sense, however, is merely to say that it is a

83. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641-42 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 1631 & n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1717, 1720 (1992));
see supra Part I.B.
85. 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
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decision about the reach of federal power; every decision construing an enumerated federal power is equally "about federalism."
Thus, any decision interpreting the Commerce Clause-or any other
grant of power to the federal government-is, in this broad sense,
a federalism decision. To characterize the decision as about federalism in this sense, therefore, is simply to restate the straightforward
fact that the decision construes an enumerated federal power.8 6
That does not necessarily make the description inaccurate, but it
does make it uninteresting since it says nothing in particular about
the actual decision or federalism doctrine. Commentators claiming
that Lopez rests on federalism grounds must be understood as
saying more than that the decision concerns the reach of federal
power.
In a more pointed and useful sense, federalism concerns the
entrustment of certain matters to state and local government. A
classic federalism decision-City of New York 7 is a good
example-would be one that declared certain matters to be constitutionally entrusted exclusively to the states. Such a decision is
typically based on federalism values, such as the benefits of state
and local control over certain areas and the correlative benefits of
86. Tangential references to federalism in the broad sense can be found in several of
the Court's Commerce Clause decisions. For example, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court admonished that the commerce power "must be
considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as
to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them,
in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what
is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government." See Lopez,
115 S. Ct at 1628-29 (quoting this language). And Lopez itself concludes with the statement that to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act "would require us to conclude that
the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated,
and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local." Id. at 1634 (citation omitted). Read in their contexts, these comments are merely
restatements of the fundamental but uncontroversial principles that the federal government
is a government of enumerated powers, that it would be inconsistent with the system of
enumerated powers if the federal government were able to exercise powers other than
those enumerated, and that an underlying presupposition of the system is that some powers remain with the states. See Gibbons v. Ogden, (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) (Marshall,
CJ.) (noting that the enumeration of certain powers presupposes the reservation of some
powers to the states). These principles are not in tension with Marshall's famous
characterization of the commerce power in Gibbons as "complete in itself. . . and
acknowledg[ing] no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Id. at 196.
Cf DAVI L. SHApIO, FEDERAiiSM 20 (1995) ("Article I, then, affords little if any
comfort to those who would find in the Constitution a guarantee of state sovereignty or
even of significant state authority or autonomy.").
87. 112 S. Ct 2408 (1992).
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restricting the federal government to its proper limited realm. It is
clear from their discussions that many commentators do indeed see
Lopez as a federalism decision in this narrow sense. 8
The flaw in characterizing Lopez as a federalism decision in
the narrow sense is that the decision rested exclusively on Commerce Clause grounds, and the Commerce Clause is plainly not a
limitation on federal power or a source of state power at all. For
one thing, that a congressional enactment is not within the commerce power does not establish that it is not within some congressional power. So the determination whether something is not within
the commerce power is different from the determination of whether
something is outside the reach of federal power, the fact that the
commerce power is limited should not be confused with the idea
that the Commerce Clause limits Congress's power.
More fundamentally, the Commerce Clause test on which the
decision in Lopez turned-whether the regulated activity has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce-does not appeal to federalism values. The issue is not, for example, whether the activity is
integral to state and local government function or whether local
experimentation in the area would be effective. This is plain from
the Court's decisions sanctioning the expansion of the scope of the
commerce power, as the national economy has expanded, into areas
that were previously within exclusively local control. These decisions have approved the swelling commerce power, without regard
to the benefits of state and local control, on the basis that previously local activities have become more integrated in the national
economy. Indeed, nothing in the Court's Commerce Clause precedents or the clause itself prevents Congress's power from extending
to any activities that interstate commerce comes to encompass.

88. According to Professor Friedman's interpretation of Lopez, for example, even the
revised act would be outside the scope of congressional authority "because the regulation
of guns in and around schools is a job properly allocated to state and local governments,
and thus is beyond the power of the national congress." Hearings, supra note 9, at I
(statement of Professor Barry Friedman); see also id. at 3. Professor Brickey sees the
"real significance" of Lopez as a message that the act, like many other recent federal
criminal laws, "federalized a local crime" without regard to the importance of decentralized solutions to crime problems and without regard to the effect on the federal courts.
Brickey, supra note 8, at 839 (emphasis added). Moreover, Brickey, like other commentators, groups Lopez with genuine federalism decisions from the Court that delineated limits
on the power of federal courts vis-a-vis state courts. See id.at 842 n.247 (citing Wilton
v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S.Ct. 2137 (1995) and Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075
(1993)).
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Of course, the Commerce Clause's grant of power to Congress
may have to be reconciled with any constitutional provision, most
significantly the Tenth Amendment, that is interpreted to limit federal power by providing an exclusive grant of power to the states.
But that possibility, which is true of any federal legislative power,
is far from the proposition that the Commerce Clause itself
establishes or incorporates an exclusive grant of power to the
states. A decision that the Commerce Clause states a limitation on
federal power-that is, places an area beyond the reach of the
federal government, even under, for example, the Spending
Clause-would be a startling and unprecedented reading of a clause
that is plainly an affirmative grant of power.89
But even if Lopez should not be characterized as a federalism
decision, the decision does mark a milestone in an ongoing debate

89. There is a possible third, intermediate sense in which a decision could be about
federalism. According to this sense, even if a decision does not involve entrustment of an
area to the states, a decision would still be a federalism decision if it takes into account
federalism values, such as the benefits of local control, in interpreting the reach of a
federal power. For example, in the area of habeas corpus, the Court has taken account of
federalism interests in comity and finality in interpreting the general congressional commands to entertain applications on behalf of persons held "in custody in violation of the
Constitution" and to dispose of the writ "as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
2243 (1994); see, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976) (holding, in part on
ground of comity, that habeas relief may not be granted based on a Fourth Amendment
claim as to which the state has provided a full and fair hearing). Interestingly, the footnote in Lopez that expressly invoked federalism concerns quoted a habeas corpus case,
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), in which the Court announced a different
harmless-error standard on habeas than applies on direct appeal. Thus, even if the Commerce Clause itself does not foreclose federal power's extending to any particular activity
(were the activity to become sufficiently integrated with the national economy), a decision
interpreting the clause could still be interpreted as a federalism decision if federalism
values are factors relevant to the determination whether an activity is within the commerce power. This idea provides a possible way of understanding Justice Kennedy's suggestion in his concurring opinion in Lopez that the act is invalid because the intrusion on
state sovereignty was too significant "[a]bsent a stronger connection or identification with
commercial concerns." 115 S. Ct. at 1642.
The problem with interpreting Lopez as a federalism decision in this third sense is
twofold. First, the Court makes clear that the case turns on the substantial effects test,
and nothing in the Court's Commerce Clause precedents supports the idea that an effect
on interstate commerce that would otherwise count as substantial would not if the activity
regulated is within a traditional state area. Second, and relatedly, there is no apparent
connection between the question whether a regulated activity is interstate commerce or
substantially affects interstate commerce and the question whether the regulation frustrates
state experimentation or otherwise impinges on federalism values. If the revised Gun-Free
School Zones Act is valid so long as it regulates interstate commerce, it is difficult to
see what work federalism values might be doing.
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about the proper reach of the federal criminal law, and that debate
certainly turns in part on federalism values. Thus, in addition to
the writers who read the Lopez decision in federalism terms, many
others criticize the original and revised acts on federalism
grounds. 90 Thus, the result (if not the reasoning) in Lopez, read in
the context of the ongoing federalization debate, does present an
occasion for renewed reflection on the proper reach of the federal
criminal law. In the context of this broader debate, the decision in
Lopez struck many commentators as salutary for helping to effect a
more appropriate allocation of law enforcement responsibility between the federal and state governments. For those commentators,
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an inappropriate exercise of
federal power in an area best left to the states. These criticisms are
representative of those launched generally against federal criminal
legislation in traditionally local areas. Given the apparently continuing trend in Congress to expand the reach of the federal criminal
law, it is important to consider exactly why commentators think
legislation such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act offends federalism values. The next section appraises several of the arguments
that have gained wide currency in the federalization debate.
B. Federalism Criticisms of Act
The Gun-Free School Zones Act is often grouped with other
federal criminal legislation passed in recent years regulating conduct in traditionally state areas. Like the act, statutes such as the
Child Support Recovery Act of 1992,91 the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994,' and the federal carijacking statute93 establish concurrent federal criminal jurisdiction over conduct historically regulated exclusively by the states.9" The federalization of

90. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. Some such critics, while
recognizing explicitly that federalism grounds cannot serve to invalidate the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, rely on those grounds to argue that the act and similar legislation are
unwise uses of federal power. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9, at 1, 8 (statement of
Professor Larry Kramer); Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization,
46 HASTINGS U. 1247, 1248-49 (1995) (arguing that federalizing local crimes subverts
federalism values and wastes resources).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(20) (1994) (making payment of child support a potential condition of probation).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
94. For reasons discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 108-110, it is best
to address federal drug legislation separately from other recent statutes establishing concur-
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crime has generated considerable debate in both the political95 and
scholarly arenas.' Most of the arguments on both sides of the
federalization debate have been well-canvassed in the literature.'
We focus here on three claims that figure prominently in the de-

bate, but that have been the subject of relatively little critical evaluation.
First, critics argue that the act will be utterly ineffective because enacting federal criminal legislation is a futile way to address
local "street" crime. Professor Friedman emphasizes this point:
What is most troubling about this legislation is that it
offers little hope at all for helping with the terrible gun
problem in our schools .... The act offers no federal
resources to help keep guns out of schools or detect them
when they are there. There98 have been very few prosecutions under the federal act.
Professor Kramer makes a similar argument in support of his claim
that the usual justifications for federal action are not present:
"[The FBI is not about to start posting its agents around the more
than 100,000 schools in this country," so "adopting [this law]
won't help." Relatedly, critics suggest that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act and other recent federal criminal laws were enacted
merely for short-term political gain and are not seriously intended
to address local crime problems."°

rent federal jurisdiction over traditionally state crimes.
95. See, e.g. George Allen, A Federalist Perspective on the Crime Problem, 4 CoR-

NELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 535, 535 (1995) (arguing that state governments are best situated
to develop crime control mechanisms).
96. The authors have been active participants in the debate, laying out and defending a
theory of concurrent federal criminal jurisdiction according to which Congress may appropriately create a new federal crime when the federal government has a comparative advantage in handling some specific aspect of a crime problem that the states are not fully
able to address. See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 14; Harry Litman & Mark D.
Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS

AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 72 (1996).
97. See, e.g., Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Roles of the Federal and
States Governments in the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965 (1995); The
Federal Role in Criminal Law, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 15 (James

Strazella ed., 1996).
98. Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman).
99. Hearings, supra note 9, at 10 (statement of Professor Larry Kramer); see also
Kadish, supra note 90, at 1249 ("[Flederalizing street-type crimes . .. requires the kind
of on-site policing that the federal criminal system has never been any good at.").
100. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman); Allen,
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Second, critics of the act argue that it, as well as other recent
federal criminal legislation, impinges on core federalism values.

They assert that the act invades core state functions;10 interferes

with state efforts to address the problem of guns in school by
thwarting state and local experimentation;" °2 and harms de-

mocracy by transferring responsibility to the less responsive and
accountable federal government. 3
Third, commentators charge that the recent legislation is
swamping the federal courts with local criminal matters. According
to Professor Brickey, for example, "[tihis trend [of federalizing
local crime] has had profound implications for the federal justice
system. The federal courts are overwhelmed with criminal
cases."'"' This claim of swamping the federal courts is the most
widely heard and strenuously made objection to the new federal
criminal legislation. 5 The federal judiciary has itself been one of
the most prominent proponents of this objection." And the
many critics who echo the judges' objection tend to rely heavily
on the pronouncements of judges and judicial bodies. 7

supra note 95; Kadish, supra note 90.
101. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 11, at 721.
102. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman); id.
at 10-11 (statement of Professor Larry Kramer) (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624, 1641
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
103. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 9-10 (statement of Professor Larry Kramer);
Calabresi, supra note 82, at 803; cf Hearings, supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Professor
Barry Friedman) (stating that the consequence of statutes such as Gun-Free School Zones
Act is that citizens are led to believe this is a problem that can and should be solved in
Washington).
104. Kathleen Brickey, The Commerce Clause and Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two
Thieves, 543 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. ScI. 27, 38 (1996) (footnote omitted).
105. For examples of the many commentators raising this claim, see Sarah Sun Beale,
Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HAsTINGS L.J. 979, 983-91 (1995); Brickey, Crime Control,
supra note 8, at 841; John B. Oakley, The Myth of Cost-Free JurisdictionalReallocation,
543 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 52, 59-61 (1996).
106. See William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the Judiciary, reprinted in 26
THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 3 (1994); COMMITEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL

COURTS, 22 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter ComwrrrEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING]. See generally, Brickey, supra note 8, at 839-42 (citing reports by prominent judicial groups).
107. See Kadish, supra note 90, at 1250-51 (quoting judicial commentary).
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C. Responses to Federalism Objections
There is a fundamental flaw in the federalism criticisms of the
act and of other recent federal criminal legislation in traditionally
state areas. The flaw stems from a failure to take account of how
the federal criminal legislation is designed to address local crime.
Contrary to the implicit assumption of these criticisms, the act and
other recent legislation in traditionally state areas do not supplant
state criminal legislation and bring vast numbers of local crimes
into federal court. Rather, the legislation merely creates concurrent
federal jurisdiction, making federal prosecutions possible in select
cases where the need for a federal response is difficult to deny.
Both by design and in practice, federal prosecutions occur in only
a tiny fraction of the cases covered by the federal criminal legislation.
At the outset, it is important in assessing federalism objections
to recent legislation to address drug laws separately from other
statutes establishing concurrent federal jurisdiction in traditionally
state areas. There are strong reasons why drug legislation is a
singular case from which no general conclusions about the wisdom
of federalization can be drawn. The discussion in this subsection
addresses objections to the federalization of crime in general (i.e.
as these objections relate to legislation other than the federal drug
laws). First, drug cases constitute a substantial portion of the
criminal cases in the federal courts; the number of prosecutions for
violations of federal drug laws dwarfs the number of prosecutions
under the other statutes at issue in the federalization debate. For
that reason, to base general claims about federalization on the
impact of drug laws would severely misrepresent the effects of the
other legislation."° The point is not that federal drug legislation

108. For example, one claim often voiced by critics of federalization is that the federal

statutes creating concurrent federal jurisdiction over traditionally state crimes are swamping
the federal courts, impeding them from fulfilling their important other functions. See infra
text accompanying notes 140-41. Since drug cases constitute such a large proportion of
the federal docket, the effect of federalization in general cannot be properly evaluated
unless the effects of non-drug legislation are separately analyzed. Even if the federal
courts were swamped, it would tell us little about the effect of federalization in general if
the drug laws were themselves almost solely responsible for the swamping. To assert that
the recent federal legislation, including the drug laws, is swamping the federal courts
without segregating the particular effects of the federal drug laws is something like
asserting that heart disease, lightning, and snakebites kill hundreds of thousands of people

every year.
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is wise or effective but that the criticisms of it need to be separated from criticisms of the other federal criminal legislation."°
Otherwise, the effects of federalization will be judged simply by
the effects of the federal drugs laws. Second, and relatedly, drug

laws present a special case because of the national focus on drugs
and the exceptionally strong political consensus to attack drugs at
the national level.

Thus, federalism-based

arguments

against

national drug laws are not only assailable but largely academic,
since there is no reasonable prospect of significant opposition to

those laws in Congress."'
As we have elaborated elsewhere,"' federal criminal legislation is appropriate when the distinctive attributes of the federal
government-for example, its interjurisdictional reach and its specialized investigative resources-put it in a qualitatively better
position". than the states to handle a specific aspect of a
problem of national dimension that the states are not fully able to
address. For example, a particular criminal enterprise may spread
across numerous states in a way that makes it difficult for any one
state to investigate and prosecute, or a particular crime may raise
issues that are so sensitive locally that effective prosecution
requires the independence of the federal courts. It is often

impossible to draft a statute in a way that includes only those
crimes that are sophisticated, interjurisdictional, or sensitive enough
to require a federal solution. In order to allow sufficient flexibility

109. Nevertheless, although we set aside drug legislation for the reasons given in the
text, the responses to the federalism objections apply in large part to the criticisms of
federal drug laws.
110. Indeed, some strong proponents of federalism insist on an even more expansive
role for the federal government in the area of drug interdiction. The 1996 Presidential
election provides a case in point. During the campaign, Senator Dole in a number of
speeches combined tributes to the Tenth Amendment and federalism with calls for an
expanded federal role in the war on drugs, featuring the domestic use of the U.S. armed
forces. See, e.g., Bob Sipchen, Dole Assails Clinton's Record in War on Drugs, LA.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1996, at A10. See also, Peter Slevin, Clinton, Dole Differ Sharply on
Strategy to Battle Drug Abuse, RALEIGH NEws & OBsERvER, Aug. 31, 1996, at A4
(describing Dole's "appeal for a wider Pentagon role" in the war on drugs).
111. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 96, at 81-83; Harry Litman & Mark D.
Greenberg, Reporters' Draft for the Working Group on Federal-State Cooperation, 46
HASTINGS LJ. 1319, 1330 (1995) [hereinafter Litman & Greenberg, Reporters' Draft].
112. The federal government's position is qualitatively (as opposed to merely quantitatively) better than a state's position when the federal government's investment of a certain
amount of resources would be more effective than a state's investment of the same
amount of resources.
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to bring a federal prosecution when an aspect of a law enforcement
problem requires it, federal criminal legislation inevitably will have
to be overinclusive. It will have to be drafted in a way that
includes criminal activities that state and local criminal justice
systems can adequately address, as well as activities that they
cannot. Federal prosecutors and other law enforcement agencies, in
cooperation with state law enforcement, can then select from the
many cases covered by both federal and state criminal legislation
the cases in which federal prosecution would be most appropriate.
This is the regime for nearly all legislation establishing concurrent
federal criminal jurisdiction, including legislation to which few
would raise federalism objections."'
Not only is it very difficult to frame federal legislation so that
it reaches only crimes that are uncontroversially appropriate for
federal prosecution, it also is unnecessary to do so in order to
safeguard federalism values. Principles governing the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion-implemented in cooperation with state and
local authorities-can both protect federalism values and selectively
target federal efforts where they can best complement the efforts of
local authorities."' Federal prosecutors-who are better situated
than Congress to evaluate the circumstances of particular cases--can and should exercise discretion with an eye towards ensuring that cases remain in the state system unless they present exceptional circumstances that rebut the general presumption in favor of

113. A good example is federal civil rights legislation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245
(1994). The state often will have concurrent jurisdiction in civil rights cases, either under
traditional statutes criminalizing battery, harassment, etc., or, more typically in recent
years, under the state's own civil rights laws. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West
1988 & Supp. 1997).
114. For a discussion of specific principles to govern the exercise of state-federal concurrent criminal jurisdiction, see Litman & Greenberg, Reporters' Draft, supra note 111,

at 1328-38. Note that the selection for prosecution of a small fraction of potential cases is
not inconsistent with congressional intent; given the potential breadth of much if not most
federal criminal legislation, see, e.g., infra note 125, Congress must be considered to
legislate with the expectation of highly selective exercise of discretion. See Gorelick &
Litman, supra note 14, at 973. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal
Criminal Law? 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 479-81 (1996) (arguing, and decrying, that
Congress, by routinely underspecifying elements of criminal legislation, implicitly delegates
lawmaking authority that is exercised by prosecutors as well as courts).
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state prosecution.!"5 They should do so, moreover, in cooperation

with state and local authorities.
It is a fact, rarely recognized much less confronted by critics

of federalization, that state and local authorities frequently have
welcomed a cooperative federal presence in the few cases in which
they are unable to provide a fully effective response." 6 (Indeed,
Department of Justice policy specifies that if a local prosecutor
objects to a federal prosecution, the prosecution cannot go forward
unless the United States Attorney's office takes the extraordinary
step of obtaining the approval of the appropriate Assistant Attorney
General." 7) Thus, the federal contribution to local crime

problems

consists

of broad

legislation

supplementing

state

legislation in certain traditionally state areas and highly discriminating prosecutorial discretion. This combination can reinforce state
law enforcement efforts without sacrificing state and local control
over most local crime and without overwhelming the federal courts

with local criminal matters."'
115. In theory, and laying aside separation of powers concerns, Congress could pass
legislation prescribing standards to govern the exercise of prosecutorial discretion specifying which kinds of cases should be brought in federal court. There are institutional reasons, however, why the executive branch is far better suited to the task. See Litman &
Greenberg, supra note 96, at 83 n.29 (citing, for example, Congress's relative lack of
expertise in determining prosecutorial standards). The important point for present purposes,
however, is that our response to federalism objections to the creation of new federal
crimes does not imply that only federal prosecutors can appropriately attend to federalism
values.
116. The Reporters' Draft for the Working Group on Federal-State Cooperation notes
the perception of state and local prosecutors that cooperation with federal law enforcement
is valuable and describes the mechanisms that have given rise to the strongest and most
constructive working relationships. See Litman & Greenberg, Reporter's Draft, supra note
111, at 1319-27. The testimony before the Senate subcommittee included more personal
accounts of the value to state and local officials of legislation such as the revised act. A
high school principal in Milwaukee, for example, testified, "I do not care whether someone who brings a gun into school is prosecuted under a state law or a federal law. I just
want them prosecuted .... Having it said by the federal government makes a difference.
When I tell kids it is a federal crime, it gets through to them. . . . You should not
underestimate the importance of your role.' Hearings, supra note 9, at 4 (statement of
Robert Nelson). Similarly, the national legislative chair of the Fraternal Order of Police,
noting the rise in violent crime in some schools testified, "[O]n a more practical level
and speaking solely from a law enforcement perspective, both state and federal laws making it a crime to bring guns into the schools will help. State prosecutors will presumably
use these statutes more often than their federal counterparts-but local district attorneys
can refer some prosecutions to U.S. Attorneys when doing so makes sense.' Id. at 3
(statement of Don Cahill).
117. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual, § 9-103.132 (1988).
118. For more detailed development of this idea, see Gorelick & Litman, supra note 14,
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The facts behind the decision to bring a federal prosecution in
the Lopez case provide an instructive case study. A number of

critics of the Gun-Free School Zones Act hold up the prosecution
in Lopez as a paradigm of intrusive and capricious federal prosecution of a pedestrian local crime.119 The actual background to the
prosecution, however, illustrates precisely the opposite: a selective
federal response welcomed by local authorities and designed to

exploit a federal comparative advantage in a very small number of
relatively serious cases.
The prosecution of Alfonso Lopez has its genesis in a federalstate program set up to prosecute Gun-Free School Zones Act
cases. The local police welcomed the idea of a state-federal partnership because the possession of guns had caused a number of
serious disruptions in schools, and because long delays in the state
system had impeded the effectiveness of state prosecutions. The
program took the form of a task force comprising members of the
San Antonio Independent School District "SAISD" Police Department, the ATF, and the United States Attorney's Office for the
Western District of Texas. The task force decided to prosecute selected cases as part of the "Triggerlock" initiative, a national
program of federal-state cooperation that targets certain violent
offenders for prosecution under federal firearms laws."z The
Lopez case itself was referred by state authorities for federal prosecution at the instigation of state authorities because of the special

at 972-78. It is possible of course that the federal presence may genuinely chafe in
particular cases, either because it is inappropriately high-handed or because the federal
government seeks to assert a stronger interest in prosecution. See Brickey, supra note 8,
at 841-42. These instances do not, however, frame an argument against the institutional
capacity of the federal government to attend to federalism values.
119. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merrit, Commerce!, 94 MiCH. L. REv. 674, 694 (1995)
("There was no evidence . . . that Lopez was a sophisticated criminal who might evade
the clutches of local law enforcement officers. .. . The Government never explained why
the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Lopez's district decided to initiate federal charges in this
purely local case"):; Brickey, supra note 8, at 805 n.24. Brickey suggests that the
decision to bring the Lopez case federally was "curious" on the ground that Texas law
provided for a harsher sentence than federal law. This suggestion both overlooks factors
other than length of sentence that can militate in favor of a federal prosecution, see, e.g.,
infra text accompanying note 118, and fails to take into account considerations-such as
the abolition of parole in the federal system-that in practice determine the length of time
offenders actually serve.
120. For a description of the Triggerlock program see Litman & Greenberg, supra note
111, at 1325.
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feature of the involvement of gangs: Lopez had brought the gun to
school in order to deliver it to a participant in a gang war.
The work of the task force, and in particular the strategy of
selective prosecution of a few offenders, was strongly supported by
local law enforcement. The SAISD police felt that federal prosecution had been salutary in the few cases in which it had been used
and, more broadly, that the threat of federal prosecution was a
valuable tool for local law enforcement. When, in reaction to the
Fifth Circuit decision invalidating the act, the United States
Attorney's Office stopped bringing prosecutions, the SAISD police
protested vehemently. The police thereafter continued to work with
federal authorities to bring selected firearms cases under other
federal statutes providing concurrent jurisdiction.
1. Effectiveness
The Lopez case thus itself illustrates an approach to a federal
role in combatting local crime that entails targeting for federal
prosecution a small number of cases that exploit a comparative
advantage of the federal government. In light of this approach, it is
misguided to argue that the Gun-Free School Zones Act will not
solve the problem of guns in school because the federal government will not commit the resources necessary to prosecute every
crime covered by the statute. The facts that there have been very
few prosecutions under the act 121 and that "the FBI is not about
to start posting its agents around the more than 100,000 schools in
this country"'" constitute no criticism of legislation that is
intended not to result in federal prosecution of every gun possession in a school zone, but to make federal intervention available
where it is needed. (Also, the posting of FBI agents in schools is
not a prerequisite for federal prosecution; indeed, the far more
common pattern, as exemplified by the San Antonio task force, is
a federal-state partnership in which state law enforcement agents
work with federal prosecutors.) Brickey makes a similar critique of
a provision passed overwhelmingly by the Senate that would have
made it a federal offense to use a gun that had passed in interstate
commerce in any crime of violence. Brickey is right that the provision would have been an inappropriate use of federal criminal

121. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman).
122. Id. at 11 (statement oi !hrofessor Larry Kramer).
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jurisdiction, but the reason it is inappropriate is not, as she asserts,
that the provision "would have swamped the federal courts with
more than 600,000 new prosecutions a year."'" Since federal
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies would not-and could
not-have brought prosecutions in more than a few of the hundreds of thousands of possible cases, Brickey's worry is unwarranted. 12 4 Rather, the provision would have been an inappropriate use
of federal criminal jurisdiction because the case for the federal
government's comparative advantage over the states had not been

made."as In sum, a valid critique of the act's effectiveness either
would have to evaluate whether the few cases in which federal
prosecutions are brought are cases in which federal intervention is
appropriate or would have to demonstrate that there are no such
appropriate cases.
As the events that led to the federal prosecution of the Lopez
case illustrate, selective use of the act to bring cases federally that

the states could not prosecute as effectively can promote both local
and national interests."a Local law enforcement in West Texas
welcomed the participation of the federal government because it
ensured expeditious and substantial punishment in a narrow category of cases and raised the threat of federal prosecution in other
cases. In addition, the federal government may be positioned to
make prosecution possible in a few otherwise intractable cases.

123. Brickey, Crime Control, supra note 8, at 841.
124. The criticism, if it were valid, would similarly discredit any number of federal
criminal statutes that in theory could reach thousands of cases for every one in which a
prosecution is actually brought. For example, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994),
by its terms authorizes federal prosecution of virtually any convenience store holdup in
the country. As a matter of formal Department of Justice policy, however, the act is used
extremely selectively and only when consistent with formal guidelines that ensure the case
implicates important national interests. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 117, § 9131.040 ("The robbery provision of the [Hobbs Act] is to be utilized only in instances
involving organized crime, gang activity, or wide-ranging schemes.").
125. See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 14, at 974.
126. Indeed, it may well be that in the area of criminal law, local and national interests
overlap more than in other substantive areas. In the area of the criminal law, both state
and federal officials will frequently endorse the basic goal of the criminal law of preventing and punishing criminal conduct, and with certain important exceptions will agree on
what conduct should be singled out for criminal sanction. There remains of course potential for sharp conflict over issues such as what kinds of punishments are appropriate or
what level of police presence is desirable. These issues are important, but given the relative consensus over ultimate policy goals, it is not surprising that state and local officials
frequently support at least limited federal involvement in local law enforcement. See, e.g.,
supra note 114.
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Some cases, for example, may involve gangs that are interstate in
reach, or witness intimidation beyond the power of the state to
control.127 The criticisms of the effectiveness of concurrent federal jurisdiction thus presume an inaccurate model of federal involvement. The correct model-the model for the exercise of jurisdiction
under the Gun-Free School Zones Act and similar recent legislation-provides for a federal role that is neither indiscriminate nor
merely symbolic. Moreover, since only a few cases are targeted for
federal involvement (and those are selected in cooperation with
state authorities), there is little risk of swamping the courts or
usurping state prerogatives.
2. Federalism Values
Contrary to the assertions of critics, statutes like the Gun-Free
School Zones Act do not preempt state legislation and generate
relatively few prosecutions (and those mostly in cooperation with
state authorities). Such statutes therefore do not strongly implicate
concerns about frustrating state experimentation and local preferencstates from traditionally state provinces, or harming
es, excluding
democracy.' 28
The vast majority of criminal justice system resources are and
will continue to be state and local. Compared with the dramatic
growth in federal criminal jurisdiction, federal prosecutorial resources remain relatively constant, limiting the federal
government's actual prosecutions to appropriately 35,000 per year,
well less than five percent of all prosecutions nationally. Thus, bare
practicalities, as well as the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
according to established guidelines, ensure that "federalization" will
continue to be a misnomer for the institution of a federal presence
in a traditionally state criminal law area.'

127. See, e.g., id at 970-71 (describing successful federal prosecution of gang member

who had ordered the murder of three witnesses and intimidated jurors at state trial, which
ended in a hung jury).
128. There is an element of inconsistency in the criticisms of federalization. At the
same time that critics worry that federal criminal legislation will be ineffective because
few prosecutions will be brought and because federal resources will not be made available
on a large scale, they also maintain that the very same legislation will "federalize" the
area, removing state control, supplanting state efforts, and thwarting state experimentation.
129. To take the example of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, in the five years that the
act was operative there were fewer than 100 prosecutions brought under it, and a large
percentage of those were in the Western District of Texas, where the local authorities explicitly invited a federal presence. This infrequent exercise of prosecutorial power in areas
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Since prosecutions under the Gun-Free School Zones Act are
limited to a small fraction of possible prosecutions selected in
cooperation with state and local authorities, it is difficult to see
how the act interferes with state experimentation and with satisfaction of local preferences. Consider Justice Kennedy's examples of
creative state efforts to deal with the problem of guns in
school." ° The mere enactment of the Gun-Free School Zones Act
and the institution of a small number of prosecutions under it
would not prevent states from providing inducements to inform on
violators, from imposing penalties on parents for failure to supervise children, or from enacting laws providing for the suspension
or expulsion of students carrying guns."' Similarly, if the local
preference is for harsher, more lenient, or otherwise different treatment of persons taking guns into schools, that preference will be
very little disturbed by a few federal prosecutions. Indeed, it may
be that the state's interests are best served by a regime of concurrent jurisdiction under which the policy choices embodied in state

of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction is not an anomaly. Indeed, it is a product of
design. Not only do limited federal resources foreclose widespread federal involvement, the
Department of Justice's prosecutorial criteria institutionalize the limitation of federal prosecutions in traditional state areas to those few cases in which a comparative federal advantage militates strongly in favor of federal prosecution. The criteria also are designed to
ensure cooperation with state and local counterparts in law enforcement to produce a
consensus about which rare cases are appropriate for federal prosecution. Department
guidelines thus incorporate federalism values at both a substantive and a procedural level.
Under the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994), for example, which
potentially covers many thousands of cases, the Department's prosecutorial criteria are
designed to target the few cases that states are unable to handle because of interstate
barriers. See Mary Jo White, Collecting Child Support Is a Federal Matter, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1995, at A19. The Department filed charges under the Child Support Recovery
Act against only 28 persons last year. Thus, although the federal government theoretically
could prosecute thousands of cases of guns in schools-interfering thoroughly with state
control-any such worry is chimerical.
130. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (listing the creation of inducements to inform on
offenders, the institution of programs encouraging the voluntary surrender of guns, the
imposition of penalties on parents, and the expulsion or assignment to special facilities of
students who bring guns to school).
131. The only one of Justice Kennedy's examples of experiments that even arguably
would be stymied is the institution of programs, including some provision for amnesty, to
encourage students to voluntarily turn in guns. Conceivably, students would be deterred
from turning in guns because the state amnesty would not cover the unlikely possibility
of federal prosecution. However, such programs could be saved by obtaining the cooperation of the United States Attorney's Office. In general, commentators frequently do not
stop to consider how exactly the Gun-Free School Zones Act is supposed to interfere with
experimentation. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Professor Barry Friedman)
(claiming federal laws interfere with state experiments without saying how).
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legislation apply in the run of cases but a federal response, including a harsher penalty, is available in a few otherwise intractable
cases."' This leaves the charge that federalization of crime is
bad for democracy because it puts the less accountable federal
government

arguments

in charge.

that

This argument is stronger than the

federalization

prevents

experimentation

and

frustrates local preferences, but it too fades in light of a fuller
understanding of the way in which federal criminal jurisdiction is
exercised. The mere enactment of federal criminal legislation in a
traditionally state area can be understood to impair state
sovereignty since conduct within the area is now subject to federal
as well as state standards. (Of course, it could be said that such
state sovereignty is already impaired as a matter of constitutional
design by the mere existence of congressional power that reaches
into traditionally state areas.133) However, such impairment seems
more symbolic than substantive, and it is not clear why it should
provoke particular concern, especially when balanced against the
need to address aspects of pressing national problems that states
are unable or unwilling to solve. The state maintains real control
over nearly all the conduct in the federalized area and has a strong
say in the selection and treatment of those few cases that will be
prosecuted federally. Similarly, the enactment of concurrent federal

legislation leaves local decision making power largely intact.
132. Moreover, even from the standpoint of federalism, states' interests are not the only
value to consider. Some cases may implicate especially strong interests of the federal
government in prosecution. A particularly good illustration of the point is dual prosecutions, such as the federal prosecutions in the Rodney King and Crown Heights cases. Under the Petite Policy, the federal government, on rare occasions, will prosecute a defendant following a state criminal trial based on the same conduct, even when the trial has
ended in a conviction. (It is well established that such prosecutions do not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).) The Petite
Policy incorporates federalism concerns in a number of ways, including by establishing a
strong presumption against reprosecution, but it nevertheless permits reprosecution where
necessary to vindicate compelling federal interests. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note
96, at 75-77. It is not illegitimate, or inconsistent with federalism, for the federal government occasionally to assert a national interest prescribed by Congress in traditionally
state areas. A strong commitment to federalism does not require a complete ceding of the
field in such areas; it may be satisfied by an overall approach to prosecution that gives
strong weight to states' interests and that makes federal prosecution the exception to the
rule of state regulation.
133. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 82, at 802 ("Similarly it would be easy to run this
analysis in reverse and show that all congressional exercises of the interstate commerce
power were invalid because they significantly affect the exclusive power of the states over
education or tort law or family law or local law enforcement.").
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Moreover, the enactment of such legislation does not prevent
citizens from holding state and local decision makers responsible
for their legislative and enforcement programs, which will remain
the nearly exclusive means of dealing with local crime.134
Particularly since it is questionable whether citizens generally draw
a sharp distinction between federal and state law enforcement, it is
implausible that the passage and selective exercise of federal legislation will impair the accountability of local government for
combating crime.
3. Workload of the Federal Courts
A third widely voiced objection to federalization of crime is
that it overwhelms the federal courts with a flood of local criminal
matters, thereby preventing those courts from fulfilling their traditional functions. In considering this objection, it is important to
distinguish between the question of what cases belong in the federal courts and the separate question of who should decide which
cases belong in federal court.
The principal source of alarm over the impact on the federal
courts of the new federal criminal legislation has been the federal
judiciary itself. As noted above, individual judges, judicial conferences and committees, and the Chief Justice himself have been
vocal in expressing their dismay over the increase in size and the
change in make-up of the workload of the federal courts. Further,
their complaints have identified Congress's enactment of legislation
addressing local street crime, especially drug violations, as the
source of the evil.' 35 Other non-judicial critics who have echoed
these complaints have based their objections on the dire pronouncements of the judiciary.'3 6

134. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69, 182-83 (1992) (holding
that federal legislation that commandeers state government interferes with the constitutional
scheme of federalism by obscuring accountability of government).
135. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMNrTEE 4-10, 35-38
(1990); COMffrrEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 106, at 12 (drug cases have
gone from 18% to 40% of the federal court's criminal caseload in the past 25 years).
The Committee on Long Range Planning notes that the criminal caseload of the federal
courts has actually decreased in the last 25 years but that "the nature and complexity of
the caseload has changed dramatically." Id. at 10-11.
136. Professor Friedman, for example, asserts that "Lopez cannot be fully understood .
without taking into account that [members] of the judiciary have joined lately in expressing concern about the increasing federalization of criminal offenses and the impact of
that federalization on the dockets of federal courts." Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings
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On closer examination, however, there is reason to discount, or
at least not to adopt automatically, the judiciary's views. Of course,
federal judges and courts are valuable sources of information bearing on the appropriate role and workload of the federal courts. But
the courts are not well suited to making decisions about the allocation of resources, and they are obviously self-interested in the issue
of their own jurisdiction.
The undemocratic, life-appointed status of the federal judiciary
well qualifies it to make disinterested decisions in concrete cases;
however, that status does not provide any special vantage point for
decisions about the wise use of national resources. The federal
courts have justifiably emphasized that the federal courts are a
scarce and valuable resource. But how to allocate scarce and valuable resources is fundamentally a political decision, best suited to
the political branches of government. Such decisions should be
made in a way that generally maximizes the satisfaction of
people's preferences or welfare, and made by decision-makers who
are positioned to investigate and respond to popular preferences
and needs.
The federal courts, in contrast to the political branches, lack
the institutional resources and expertise to determine which national
problems are most pressing and how best to go about addressing
them. The very factors that make the federal courts disinterested in
particular cases make them unresponsive to the public and inappropriate for deciding how to resolve the competing claims of different interest groups. In fact, with respect to decisions about how the
federal courts should be used, the federal courts are one of the
interest groups that are most directly affected by the outcome.
Thus, quite apart from the reasons for doubting that the federal
courts are the right kind of institution to make those decisions and
for believing that they lack much of the information that should go
into the decisions, the federal judiciary's ultimate conclusions on
its appropriate role are fairly evaluated in light of the judiciary's
own institutional self-interest. Indeed, one may question whether it
is a coincidence that the cases that the federal courts insist should
be their main staple are precisely those that are most interesting,
complex, and prestigious.'3 7
and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 757, 791 (1996).
137. See, e.g., COMMIWEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 106, at 23-24 (urg-
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Of course, the fact that the judicial warnings cannot be taken
as authoritative does not itself rebut the claim that recent federal
criminal legislation is swamping the federal courts with inappropriate cases. Similarly, the fact that Congress and the President-the
appropriate decision-makers-have enacted the legislation does not
itself imply that the legislation uses the federal courts appropriately. We have above and elsewhere elaborated a view about the
appropriate role of concurrent federal criminal jurisdiction, and it is
implicit in that view that the federal courts are properly used to
adjudicate the cases that, under the view, would be brought in
federal court. Specifically, the federal courts should be available to
adjudicate cases in which the federal criminal justice system can
make a qualitative difference to an aspect of a national problem
that the states cannot adequately address. 3 1 Thus, the jurisdiction
of the federal courts should be defined (and historically has been
defined), 13 not in terms of a special, historical subject matter,
but in terms of their function as a limited and valuable forum for
vindicating federal interests.
As to the claim that recent federal criminal legislation attacking
violent street crime threatens to overwhelm the federal courts with
inappropriate cases, it is first not clear that the federal courts are
overwhelmed at all. Many of the dire assessments appear to be
based on the mistaken assumption that the enactment of federal
criminal legislation implies that all cases covered by the legislation
will be prosecuted in federal court. (Only that assumption could
explain, for example, Professor Brickey's claim that the bill extending federal jurisdiction to almost every violent crime committed
with guns would have added 600,000 cases to the federal docket.' ) Indeed, although federal prosecutions undoubtedly have be-

ing the limitation of federal criminal jurisdiction to five narrowly drawn categories of
crimes occupying a uniquely federal domain); Federal Courts Study Committee, supra note
135, at 7-8 ("If federal courts were to begin exercising, in the normal course, the broad
range of jurisdiction traditionally allocated to the states, they would lose both their distinctive nature and, due to burgeoning dockets, their ability to resolve fairly and efficiently those cases of clear national import and interest that properly fall within the scope of
federal concern.").
138. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
139. See Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS U.
1029, 1063-64 & n.166 (1995) (tracing the 200-year history of the federalization of
crime).
140. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HAST7NOs U. 1135, 1174 (1995).
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come more complex, the overall number of federal prosecutions is
now about the same as what it was twenty-five years ago.141
Although criminal matters have undoubtedly come to occupy a
larger portion of the federal court's workload, much of the difference in the criminal workload comes from the dramatic rise in
drug cases.142 Thus, as Professor Beale documents, between 1980
and 1992, there was a fourfold increase in drug prosecutions. 43
Moreover, the percentage of federal defendants charged with drug
crimes increased between 1972 and 1992 from 18 to 41 percent,
and the complexity of the drug cases increased significantly. 1"
Also, according to Beale's analysis, other factors, such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and a higher conviction rate, are major
contributors to the swelling of the criminal part of the docket. 45
Thus, the increase in the criminal docket is not largely attributable
to statutes like the Gun-Free School Zones Act that create concurrent federal jurisdiction over nondrug crimes.
Finally, whatever the source of the increased criminal workload, it is not clear that the best response to it would be simply to
eliminate that source. We should hesitate before abandoning federal
legislation that targets unmet national needs that the federal government is better positioned than the states to address. It is a serious
problem if, as some claim, the increased criminal workload is
preventing the federal courts from fulfilling their important functions in civil cases." Of course, if that were the only problem

141. See COMmrrrEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 106, at 10. The number
of federal prosecutions has not held steady during that entire period. After a drop between
1972 and 1980, it increased from 38,033 in 1980 to over 67,632 in 1992. See Beale,
supra note 105, at 984.
142. See CoMmrrTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANING, supra note 106, at 11; Kadish, supra
note 90, at 1251.
143. Sarah Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS U. 979, 984-86 (1995).
144. See id.at 985.
145. See id. at 986-87.
146. See Federal Courts Study Committee, supra note 135, at 36 (claiming courts in
districts with particularly heavy caseloads of drug crimes are "virtually unable to try civil
cases"); Brickey, supra note 104, at 38 ("The federal courts are overwhelmed with criminal cases."). But see COMMrrEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 106, at 39
("The federal courts function effectively under their present structures, but major problems
loom on the horizon if judicial workloads continue to grow."); id., at 10 (noting delays in
civil cases caused by heavy burdens of criminal cases but identifying administrative techniques courts have developed to decrease the burdens, including increased use of alternative dispute resolution procedures and increased reliance on magistrate judges).
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and the criminal cases were appropriately in federal court, at least
part of the solution might be to increase the size of the federal
judiciary. No doubt there are important advantages to the small
size of the judiciary, but whether, at its current dimensions, the
loss from some increase in size would be outweighed by the national interests served by providing a federal forum is an open
question, though one that is outside the scope of this Article. For
immediate purposes, the important point is that there is little reason
to believe that recent federal legislation such as the Gun-Free
School Zones Act that creates concurrent federal jurisdiction over
traditionally state crimes threatens to overwhelm the federal courts
with a flood of cases that would be better handled in state courts.
CONCLUSION

The revised Gun-Free School Zones Act provides a vantage
point on several important issues of doctrine and theory relating to
the scope of the federal criminal law. Perhaps the least interesting
of these issues is also of the most immediate practical importance:
Can Congress remedy the defect identified in Lopez by the simple
expedient of adding a provision ensuring that the statute reach only
to guns that have passed in interstate commerce at some point. The
revised act will serve as a vehicle for the courts to make clear that
Congress can. The validation of the act will largely settle the extensive debate over the meaning and impact of Lopez, which will
prove to have no more than a modest impact on the interpretation
of the Commerce Clause and a negligible one on federalism jurisprudence.
The approval of the revised act will be an unwelcome development to many commentators who see little practical or theoretical difference between federal regulation of possession in school of
guns generally and federal regulation of possession in school of the
great majority of guns that have passed in interstate commerce.
The constitutionality of the revised act, however, is not a triumph
of formalism, but the consequence of a reasonable understanding of
the commerce power. According to that understanding, Congress
may criminalize the possession in school of guns that have moved
in interstate commerce. This recognition does not result in a general police power because though interstate commerce is a cause of
the possession of guns in schools, it is not a cause of every threat
to health and safety. As for the objection that the revised act has
the same purpose as the act the Court struck down in Lopez, Con-
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gress's purpose is irrelevant to the constitutionality of an exercise
of the commerce power;, and even if purpose were relevant, the
purpose of the revised act would be an appropriate one.
Others might concede that the commerce power reaches the
possession in school of guns that have crossed state lines, but see
in that result a tension with federalism values, which many view as
the true driving force behind the opinion in Lopez. But the common federalism-based criticisms of the act, in both its original and
revised versions, and of similar recent federal legislation, are not
well founded. Although we have not attempted to examine in depth
in this Article whether Congress and the Executive are in fact
making wise choices in their deployment of federal criminal jurisdiction, 47 we have sketched a view of the appropriate role of
federal criminal jurisdiction, and have critiqued three of the most
widely expressed reasons for thinking it is not being wisely used.
In contrast to the debate about the meaning of Lopez, this debate
will not be settled soon. Still, since the choices about the reach of
the federal criminal law have been made by the branches of government that, in contrast with the federal judiciary, are institutionally best suited to make them, it is at least arguable that the burden
of showing that the choices have been misguided lies with the
critics of the recent federal criminal legislation.

147. We elsewhere have addressed the wisdom of particular federal criminal statutes in
light of appropriate federalization principles. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying
text; see aLso Gorelick & Litman, supra note 14, at 974-75, 977-78 (discussing the Child
Support Recovery Act); Harry Litman & Mark Greenberg, Reporter's Draft for the
Working Group on Federal-State Cooperation, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1319, 1336 (1995);
Harry Litman & Mark Greenberg, DUAL PROSECUTIONS: A MODEL FOR CONCURRENT
FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 72, 74-78 (1996).

